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THE FIELD CITATION PROGRAM UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
CAN EPA APPLY IT To FEDERAL FACILITIES?
MAJOR KEVIN J. LUSTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Congress amended the federal enforcement provision of the
Clean Air Act ("CAA" or the "Act").' The amendment expanded the
Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA" or the "Agency") enforcement
options and considerably enhanced the Agency's administrative enforcement
powers. In section 11 3(d)(3), Congress authorized the Administrator of EPA
to implement, through regulations, a field citation program for minor viola-
tions of the CAA.3 On May 3, 1994, EPA published a notice of proposed
rulemaking for a field citation program pursuant to CAA section 1 13(d)(3). 4
EPA intends to apply the program to federal agencies, and it expects to
publish the final rule either in late March or early April of 1998.' This will
be the first program under which EPA assesses civil penalties against a unit
' Major Kevin J. Luster, U.S. Army Judge Advocate General's Corps, is an Assistant
Professor at the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, where he teaches
environmental law. B.A., 1980, California State College at San Bernardino; J.D., 1982,
University of San Diego School of Law; LL.M., Military Law, 1993, The Judge Advocate
General's School, United States Army, Charlottesville, Virginia; LL.M., Environmental Law,
1995, The National Law Center, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C.
Major Luster has served as a military trial attorney in Germany and Saudi Arabia, and as a
branch officer-rn-charge at Camp Casey, Korea. He originally wrote this article in 1995 to
satisfy, in part, the Master of Laws degree requirements at The George Washington
University.
' Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 701, § 113, 104 Stat.
2399, 2672-80 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994)).
2 See ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION LAW § 20-4, at 1008-09 (1995).
See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
4 Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59).
5 See Telephone Interview with Cary Secrest, Environmental Protection Specialist, Air
Enforcement Specialist, Air Enforcement Division, United States Environmental Protection
Agency (November 24, 1997).
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of the federal government for violations of the CAA.6 In this article, I will
discuss various aspects of EPA's proposal and whether the CAA gives EPA
the authority to apply the field citation program to federal agencies. I will
conclude that EPA has such authority. I will begin by discussing federal en-
forcement under section 113 of the Act.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enforcement Under the Clean Air Act
Section 113 is the basic federal enforcement provision of the CAA.
The 1990 amendments to the CAA significantly expanded the administrative
enforcement authorities that the 1977 version of the CAA had given EPA.
Under the 1977 CAA, EPA's enforcement options were limited to
commencing a civil action against any person violating certain requirements
under the Act and to obtaining an injunction and/or civil penalties of up to
$25,000 per day of violation.7 To impose a civil penalty, EPA typically had
to first issue a notice of violation ("NOV") to the violator and provide a copy
to the appropriate state.8 The NOV described the violation and gave the
violator thirty days to cure the problem.9 If the violator continued the
violation thirty days after receiving the NOV, EPA either issued an
administrative order or commenced a civil action in a U.S. district court
under CAA section 113(b). '0 If EPA decided to issue an administrative
6 See Telephone Interview with Sally Dalzell, Director, Site Remediation and Enforce-
ment Staff, United States Environmental Protection Agency (May 25, 1995).
7 See Clean Air Act § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(b) (1994)).
8 Section 1 13(a)(1) of the CAA required NOVs for a violation of any requirement of an
applicable implementation plan. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(a)(1) (1994)). Section 113(a)(3) stated that EPA did not have to issue NOVs for
violations of new source performance standards (section 111 (e)), hazardous emissions stan-
dards (section 112(c)), and certain inspection and reporting requirements (section 114). See
id. § 7413(a)(3) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (1994)).
See id. § 7413(a)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1) (1994)).
0 See id. § 7413(a)(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (1994)).
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compliance order, it had to afford the violator an opportunity to consult with
the Administrator concerning the violation." The compliance order de-
scribed the violation and specified a reasonable deadline by which time the
violator had to comply.' 2 If the violator failed to comply in time, EPA
commenced a civil action under CAA section 113(b). 3 Under the 1977
version of the CAA, section 113 did not provide for administrative penal-
ties.' 4 This meant that, in order to impose penalties against a violator, EPA
had to commence civil judicial action in a federal district court. This also
meant that EPA had to rely upon the Department of Justice ("DOJ") to
prosecute the civil judicial actions.' 5 Thus, the 1977 CAA did not provide
EPA with a flexible enforcement tool to address minor violations of the Act.
The 1990 amendments to the CAA addressed this problem by
scrapping old subsection 113(d) (Final compliance orders) and by autho-
rizing EPA to impose administrative penalties under new subsection 113(d)
titled Administrative assessment of civil penalties.6 Under subsection
113(d)(1), EPA may issue an administrative order against any person
incurring a civil administrative penalty of up to $25,000 per day of violation
" CAA section 1 13(a)(4) afforded a violator the opportunity to confer with the Admini-
strator before a compliance order could take effect unless the violation involved hazardous
air pollutants. See id. § 7413(a)(4) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(4) (1994)).
'2 See id.
'3 Id. § 7413(b)(1) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b)(1) (1994)).
'4 See id. § 7413(a)(2) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(2) (1994)). CAA section
120 (Noncompliance penalty), however, authorized delegated states and EPA to impose
administrative penalties upon owners or operators of noncomplying stationary sources. See
42 U.S.C. § 7420(a)(2)(A) (1994). Within 30 days of discovering the noncompliance, EPA
or the state issued the source a notice of noncompliance. See id. § 7420(b)(3). The source
had 45 days to challenge the notice and request a formal, public administrative hearing. See
id. § 7420(b)(4)(B). Otherwise, the source could concede the violation and calculate its own
penalty, which could be no less than the economic value of the delay in compliance to the
source. See id. § 7420(b)(4)(A). The penalty attempted to eliminate the economic advan-
tage of noncompliance. See REITZE, supra note 2, § 20-18(a), at 1036-37.
"s The DOJ conducts and supervises all litigation involving the United States. See 28
U.S.C. §§ 516-519 (1994); see also REITZE, supra note 2, § 20-18(a), at 1036.
6 See Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 701, § 113, 104 Stat. 2399, 2677 (1990) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1994)).
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if the person has violated or is violating an applicable implementation plan
or any other provision under subchapters I, III, IV-A, V, or VI of the CAA. 1
7
Before EPA can assess a civil administrative penalty against any source for
violating an applicable implementation plan, EPA must issue a NOV and
wait thirty days. 8 Unless the Administrator and Attorney General agree
otherwise, an administrative civil penalty may not exceed $200,000, and EPA
may not impose one for any violation older than twelve months. 9
Additionally, EPA must afford any source receiving a civil administrative
penalty under subsection 1 13(d)(1) an opportunity for a formal administrative
hearing in accordance with sections 554 and 556 of the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA"). 2° Finally, subsection 11 3(d)(3) authorizes the Ad-
ministrator to create a field citation program for minor violations of the
CAA.2 Before discussing subsection 113(d)(3) in detail in Part III, I will
discuss other field citation programs in existence when Congress authorized
the program in the 1990 CAA.
B. Early Field Citation Programs
The term "field citation" defines a class of enforcement documents
that inspectors issue for minor violations they discover in the field.22 An
inspector may issue a field citation on the spot when he discovers a violation,
or from his office after completing the inspection report.23 A field citation
" Under subsection 113(d)(1), EPA may assess civil administrative penalties for viola-
tions of applicable implementation plans and requirements under subchapters I (Programs
and Activities), III (General Provisions), IV-A (Acid Rain Deposition Control), V (Permits),
and VI (Stratospheric Ozone Deposition). See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1)(B) (1994). Sub-
section 113(d) does not apply to subchapter II, Emission Standards for Moving Sources. See
id. § 7413(d)(1).
IS See id. § 7413(d)(1)(A).
' See id. § 7413(d)(1).
21 See id. § 7413(d)(2)(A); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556 (1994).
2! See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3).
22 See William W. Sapp, Improving Wetlands Enforcement Through Field Citation, 1
ENVTL. LAW. 751, 754 (1995).
21 See id. at 754-55.
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can be in the form of any one of several types of legal documents such as: an
administrative order, a notice of violation, a short-form settlement agree-
ment, or a summons.24 Field citations are similar to traffic tickets in that they
usually address clear-cut violations, require violators to correct the violations,
usually impose small penalties, and provide an appeals process.25
In 1985, Dade County, Florida developed a field citation program to
enforce county environmental codes.2 6 Upon discovering a violation, an
inspector from the County's Department of Environmental Resources
Management would issue a warning citation to the violator which set a
deadline for the violator to correct the violation.27 The inspector reinspected
the facility at the end of the period, and if the violator had not cured the
problem, the inspector issued a citation with a $50 to $150 penalty.28
Inspectors carried calendars with them so that they could schedule hearing
dates for those violators who objected to the citations.29 Overall, seventy-five
percent of the violators complied within thirty days of receiving citations.3"
In 1988 the State of California developed a "Toxic Ticket" field
citation program for minor violations of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, also
called the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").31 When an
investigator issued a citation in the field, he would schedule an informal
conference for the violator.32 The violator could argue his case before the
informal conference or request a formal hearing.33 Before California de-
veloped the program, it took an average of 592 hours for the State's
24 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, HOW TO DEVELOP YOUR OWN UST FIELD CITATION PROGRAM 1
(EPA/530/UST-91/014, 1991) [hereinafter SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE].
25 See id.
26 See id. at 2; see also Sapp, supra note 22 at 751.
27 See SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 24, at 14.
28 See at 14, 22.
29 See id. at 24.
30 See id. at 2.
3' See id.
32 See id. at 24.
" See id.
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enforcement staff to process each minor violation." The "Toxic Ticket"
program reduced this time to seven to ten hours per case.35 Additionally, the
State reported "a very high compliance rate since instituting the 'Toxic
Ticket' program. "36
In late 1987, EPA's Office of Mobile Sources initiated a field citation
program to enforce EPA regulations for fuel dispenser nozzles.37 Under the
program, EPA inspectors issued $200 citations to gasoline retailers who
violated the fuel dispenser nozzle regulations governing fuel pumps dis-
pensing leaded gasoline.38 The citations operated as modified settlement
agreements in which EPA, in issuing a citation, offered to settle an enforce-
ment action at a fixed amount. 39 The violator could either correct the
problem and pay a modest penalty or face traditional enforcement procedures
with penalties as high as $25,000 per violation. The program substantially
reduced the number of civil judicial cases, reduced the average time the office
34 See id. at 2.
" See id.
36 Id.
37 Section 211 of the CAA authorized EPA to regulate sales of leaded gasoline. 42 U.S.C.
§ 7545(a), (c) (1994). Under the nozzle regulations, retailers selling leaded gasoline had to
equip their leaded gasoline pumps with nozzles with spouts wider than normal ends-
diameters not less than 2.363 centimeters. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(f)(1) (1995) (current
version at 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(f)(2)(i) (1996)). This helped to prevent consumers from
introducing leaded gasoline into motor vehicles labeled "Unleaded Gasoline Only," because
the fuel tank intakes for new, unleaded vehicles were less than 2.363 centimeters in diameter.
By 1992, EPA had stopped issuing field citations for nozzle violations because of the phase-
out of leaded gasoline. See Telephone Interview with Richard Ackerman, Environmental
Specialist, Office of Enforcement, United States Environmental Protection Agency (June 16,
1995).
38 See SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 24, at 2.
0 See id. at 10.
40 Under the 1977 version of the CAA, EPA could initiate a civil action in a U.S. district
court to recover a $10,000 civil penalty for each day a person violated any regulation EPA
had promulgated under section 211. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(d) (1988). Under the 1990 CAA,
EPA can initiate a civil action in a U.S. district court to recover a civil penalty of $25,000
for each day a person violates a section 211 regulation, plus the amount of any economic




spent on a case from three months to one month, and nearly eliminated the
office's enforcement backlog.4
These early programs demonstrated that field citations were quick,
inexpensive, and encouraged prompt compliance. However, since these pro-
grams were relatively new, they lacked long track records.42 Even so, in 1989
EPA decided to pursue authority to establish a field citation program in the
upcoming amendments to the CAA.a3
III. THE 1990 AMENDMENT
A. Authority to Implement a Field Citation Program
In the 1990 amendments to the CAA, Congress authorized the
Administrator of EPA to issue regulations to create a field citation program
after consulting with the Attorney General and the states." Under the
4' See SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 24, at 2.
42 See Telephone Interview with Jane Engert, Environmental Scientist, Office of Compli-
ance, United States Environmental Protection Agency (May 25, 1995).
41 See Sapp, supra note 22, at 751-53.
44 Clean Air Act § I 13(d)(3) states:
The Administrator may implement, after consultation with the Attorney
General and the States, a field citation program through regulations
establishing appropriate minor violations for which field citations assess-
ing civil penalties not to exceed $5,000 per day of violation may be issued
by officers or employees designated by the Administrator. Any person to
whom a field citation is assessed may, within a reasonable time as
prescribed by the Administrator through regulation, elect to pay the
penalty assessment or to request a hearing on the field citation. If a
request for a hearing is not made within the time specified in the
regulation, the penalty assessment in the field citation shall be final. Such
hearing shall not be subject to section 554 or 556 of Title 5, but shall
provide a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
Payment of a civil penalty required by a field citation shall not be a
defense to further enforcement by the United States or a State to correct
a violation, or to assess the statutory maximum penalty pursuant to other
authorities in the chapter, if the violation continues.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
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program, EPA could assess civil penalties, not to exceed $5000 per day of
violation, for "appropriate minor violations." '4 Though CAA section 113 did
not define "minor violations," Congress intended for EPA to issue field
citations for minor violations discovered during inspections and for violations
of routine reporting and recordkeeping requirements. 6 The amendment does
not specifically state to whom EPA may issue field citations; though it does
state that "[a]ny person to whom a field citation is assessed may ... elect to
pay the penalty assessment or to request a hearing on the field citation."47
Congress also directed that a hearing on a field citation shall not be subject
to the formal administrative hearing procedures of sections 554 or 556 of the
APA, and instead required that EPA provide the person who has received a
field citation a "reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evi-
dence. ' 41
B. Appellate Review
Any person incurring a penalty under a field citation may seek review
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or for the
district in which the alleged violation occurred, or where the person or
business resides.49 The violator has thirty days from the date of the final
agency decision on the assessment in which to file his appeal." The district
court may only review the record and it may only set aside or remand the
order if it finds that there is no substantial evidence in the record to support
the finding of a violation or that the order or penalty constitutes an abuse of
discretion."
41 See id.
41 See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 365 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3748.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3).
48 Id. The APA is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335,
5372, 7521 (1994).







Upon receiving Congressional authorization to create a field citation
program, EPA did not immediately propose regulations for the program;52 it
did not publish a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") until May 3,
1994.13 In January 1991 the Administrator appointed a working group to
consider alternatives and to propose a rule.54 The group discussed various
state and federal programs in existence. In particular, they considered EPA's
underground storage tank ("UST") program and the Coast Guard's oil spill
program under section 311 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")."5 The group
analyzed EPA's UST program for its citation format, the types of violations
52 In promulgating the regulations for the field citation program, EPA must satisfy the
rulemaking procedures Congress enumerated in CAA section 307 (Administrative pro-
ceedings and judicial review). See 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (1994). Under the section 307 rule-
making procedures, EPA must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking ("NPRM") in the
Federal Register and invite public comments. See id. § 7607(d)(3). The NPRM must state
the basis and purpose for the rule. See id. The agency must summarize in the NPRM any
factual data, major legal interpretations, and policies it considered in developing the rule.
See id. § 7607(d)(3)(A)-(C). EPA must maintain all documents and comments concerning
the proposed rule in a rulemaking docket available for public inspection. See id.
§ 7607(d)(4)(A). The agency also must publish the final rule in the Federal Register. See
id. § 7607(d)(5). It must restate the basis and purpose of the rule, explain why it changed the
proposed rule, and respond to each significant comment. See id. § 7607(d)(6)(A). The
agency may not base the rule on any information or data not in the rulemaking docket. See
id. § 7607(d)(6)(C). The rulemaking docket is the agency's record for the purpose of any
judicial review of the rulemaking. See id. § 7607(d)(7)(A). Generally, a person will not have
standing to bring suit and object to the rulemaking unless he raised the objection during the
public comment period. See id. § 7607(d).
" See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,776 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 59).
" See Field Citation Rule for Air Act Violations Will Be Proposed in June, EPA Official
Says, 22 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2517 (March 13, 1992).
" See Telephone Interview with John Hannon, Staff Attorney, Air and Radiation Division,
Office of the General Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency (May 25,
1995).
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it addressed, its program guidance, and the training and discretion it provided
to inspectors.56 The group analyzed the Coast Guard's oil spill program pri-
marily for its appellate procedures." Before discussing the NPRM, I shall
briefly describe the UST and oil spill programs.
1. The Underground Storage Tank Field Citation Program
In 1988, EPA's Office of Underground Storage Tanks ("OUST")
began developing a field citation program to enforce subchapter IX of the
Solid Waste Disposal Act.58 EPA worked with several states to develop
"expedited enforcement" programs to enable the states to enforce efficiently
their UST regulations.59 At the same time, OUST began developing a field
citation program for the regional offices to administer.6" The Agency de-
veloped the program to fill a gap in EPA's UST enforcement scheme by
"addressing many prevalent, clear-cut violations that are relatively easy to
correct."'" It sought an enforcement tool that would deter violations while
requiring less agency resources than the traditional methods of UST enforce-
ment.62 At the time, the "traditional methods" available consisted of war-
56 See id.
5 See id.
5 See Sapp, supra note 22, at 751. See generally Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 9001-
9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6991-6991i (1994) (as amended by the Resource Conservation Act of
1976) [hereinafter RCRA]. Subchapter IX is commonly referred to as subtitle I; it covers
regulation of underground storage tanks. See id.
'9 See SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, supra note 24, at 1.
60 See Memorandum from David W. Ziegele, Acting Director of the Office of Under-
ground Storage Tanks, to Waste Management Division Directors for Regions I-III and V-IX,
Water Division Directors for Regions IV and X, and Regional Counsel for Regions I-X
(March 20, 1991) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review).
61 OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9610.13: GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL FIELD CITATION
ENFORCEMENT 1 (March 20, 1991) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law
and Policy Review) [hereinafter DIR. No. 9610.13].
62 See id.
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nings, compliance orders, and civil judicial actions.63 The Agency found that
warning orders deterred few violations and that part 22 procedures 64 for
minor, clear-cut violations consumed too much staff time and resources.65
The EPA did not implement the UST field citation program through
rulemaking; rather, it developed the program pursuant to its authority to issue
compliance orders under RCRA section 9006(a).66 The UST field citation is
actually a compliance order with a short-form settlement agreement. The
OUST entitles the UST field citation form "Expedited Enforcement Com-
pliance Order and Settlement Agreement., 67 The form consists of two parts.
Part I is the compliance order; it specifies the violations, lists the penalty
63 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9610.16: GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL FIELD CITATION
ENFORCEMENT 2-3 (October 6, 1993) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law
and Policy Review) [hereinafter DIR. No. 9610.16]. RCRA section 9003(a) directs the
Administrator to promulgate release, detection, prevention, and correction regulations for
USTs. See 42 U.S.C. § 699 lb(a) (1994). Section 9006 of RCRA establishes the federal
enforcement scheme for USTs. See id. § 6991 e. Under RCRA section 9006(a)(1), EPA can
either issue a compliance order or seek injunctive relief in a federal district court against
anyone who violates a UST regulation. See id. § 6991e(a)(l). The compliance order
specifies the violation, a reasonable time to comply, and it may assess an appropriate penalty.
See id. § 699 1e(c). The maximum civil penalty for failing to comply with a UST regulation
is $10,000 per tank. See id. § 6991e(d). If a violator fails to comply with an order, he also
may be liable for a $25,000 civil penalty for each day of continued noncompliance. See id.
§ 699 1e(a)(3). Upon receiving a compliance order, a violator has thirty days in which to
request a public hearing on the order. See id. § 699 1e(b).
64 EPA's Consolidated Rules of Practice Governing the Administrative Assessment of
Civil Penalties and the Revocation or Suspension of Permits ("part 22") govern the public
hearings for the RCRA section 9006 compliance orders and civil penalties. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 22.01(a)(4) (1996); see also infra note 71.
65 See DIR. No. 9610.13, supra note 61, at 1.
66 See 42 U.S.C. § 699 1e(a); Sapp, supra note 22, at 757.
67 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION AGENCY, DIRECTIVE No. 9610.14: GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL FIELD CITATION
ENFORCEMENT 9 (April 9, 1992) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and
Policy Review).
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amount, and gives the violator thirty days to cure the violation.6" Part II is the
settlement agreement." The violator accepts EPA's offer to settle by certify-
ing on Part II that he has corrected the violation and by returning the form to
the regional office within thirty days with a check for the amount of the
penalty. 70 If the violator rejects the citation, the agency will withdraw the
enforcement order, issue a new enforcement order, and seek a higher penalty
through part 22 procedures, which govern the administrative assessment of
civil penalties. 7' To ensure that violators comply, the regional offices often
conduct follow-up inspections.7
The OUST provided guidance to ensure consistency among the re-
gions in selecting appropriate violations for field citations, selecting penalty
amounts, training inspectors, and exercising discretion. According to OUST,
"[e]xperience shows that field citation programs work most effectively in
achieving compliance if the violations are clear-cut and the inspectors
exercise little discretion in citing the violations., 73 For this reason, OUST
compiled a list of common violations with corresponding penalties ranging
61 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EXPEDITED ENFORCEMENT COM-
PLIANCE ORDER AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FORM, reprinted in DIR. No. 9610.16, supra
note 63, at 26.
'9 See id.
70 See id.
71 See DIR. No. 9610.16, supra note 63, at 6, 11. Part 22 procedures refer to the formal
administrative hearing procedures set forth at 40 C.F.R. §§ 22.01-43, which EPA must
follow in assessing civil penalties under several of the statutes it administers, including the
Solid Waste Disposal Act and the CAA. See 40 C.F.R. § 22.01 (1996). Part 22 procedures
satisfy the adjudicative hearing standards of sections 554 and 556 of the APA. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 554, 556 (1994). Among other procedural rights, part 22 procedures include hearings
before impartial presiding officer or administrative law judge (section 22.21 (a)), written
motion practice (section 22.16), prohibition against ex parte communications (section 22.08),
discovery (section 22.19(7)(b)(0), subpoenas (sections 22.33(b), .34(c), .37(0, .39(b), .40(b),
.43(c)), right to cross-examine witnesses (section 22.22(b)), interlocutory appeals (section
22.29(a),(b)), and appeals to the Environmental Appeals Board (sections 22.29-.30). See 40
C.F.R. pt. 22. Part 22 procedures govern proceedings for persons receiving administrative
penalties under CAA § 113(d)(l). See id. § 22.01(a)(2).
72 See DIR. No. 9610.16, supra note 63, at 11.
13 Id. at 5.
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from $50 to $300. 74 In selecting the penalty amounts, OUST selected
amounts it believed were high enough to deter violations, but low enough to
encourage violators to settle.75 Each region could develop its own list of
violations and penalties; however, a region could not select any violation or
penalty not on OUST's list.76 In determining which violations to cite, OUST
advised the regions to select violations that were clear-cut, easy to verify and
easy to correct.77 The OUST also told the regions to only issue field citations
to first time violators.7 8 The agency decided to apply more formal enforce-
ment measures, such as part 22 procedures, to repeat offenders.79 Finally,
OUST relied upon the regions to develop training programs for their
inspectors.8 °
2. The Coast Guard's Oil Spill Program
Under section 311 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), the U.S. Coast
Guard may assess civil penalties against any owner, operator, or person in
charge of a vessel or facility that discharges oil or hazardous substances into
U.S. waters or fails to comply with the Coast Guard's pollution prevention
regulations." The Coast Guard may assess either a Class I or Class II
penalty.82 In 1994, the Coast Guard created a field citation program for oil
4 See id. at 16-24.
7 See id. at 9.
76 See id. at 5.
" See id.
78 See id.
7 See id. at 6.
80 See id. at 12.
" See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 31 1(b)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6)(A)
(1994). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is more commonly referred to as the Clean
Water Act.
82 If the Coast Guard assesses a Class I penalty, the penalty may not exceed $10,000 for
each violation, and the total penalty amount may not exceed $25,000. See 33 U.S.C. §
1321 (b)(6)(B)(i). A person receiving a Class I penalty may request a hearing on the penalty.
See id. Hearings for Class I penalties are not subject to either section 554 or 556 of the APA,
which cover adjudication and hearing procedures. See id. A Class II penalty may not exceed
$10,000 per day for each day of violation, and the total penalty amount may not exceed
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spills of 100 gallons or less and for minor violations of Coast Guard pollution
prevention regulations.83 It adopted the new program after determining that
the subpart 1.07 civil penalty procedures were too lengthy for small oil spills
and minor violations of pollution prevention regulations.84 The Coast Guard
needed an option that would quickly resolve minor violations, reduce costs
of internal reviews, deter violations, and promptly notify violators of what
they were doing wrong. 85 Therefore, the Coast Guard amended subpart 1.07
of its regulations to permit its officers to issue notices of violations and to
propose penalty settlements.86
Under the new program, a Coast Guard officer discovering a small
release or a minor violation of the pollution prevention requirements issues
a NOV.87 The NOV describes the violation and proposes a penalty amount.88
The violator has forty-five days to accept the penalty by paying the penalty
amount.89 If he declines to pay the penalty, the Coast Guard submits the case
to a hearing officer.9" Upon receiving the case, the hearing officer examines
the case file and determines whether there is sufficient evidence of a
violation.9' If she finds a violation, the hearing officer notifies the violator
in writing of: the violation, the maximum penalty amount, the nature of the
proceedings, the penalty deemed appropriate, and the violator's rights to a
hearing.92 The violator has the option of an in-person hearing before the
hearing officer, or he can submit written evidence and argument in lieu of a
$125,000. See id. § 1321(b)(6)(B)(ii). Hearings on Class II penalties are subject to the
adjudication procedures in section 554 of the APA. See id. The Coast Guard's informal
hearing procedures for Class I penalties are codified at 33 C.F.R. subpart 1.07.
" See Simplified Alternative Procedure for Resolving Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Fed. Reg.
66,477 (1994) (codified at 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-11 (1997)).
84 See id. at 66,477.
8' See id.
86 See id.
" See 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-1 1(a) (1997); see also Simplified Alternative Procedure for Re-
solving Civil Penalty Cases, 59 Fed. Reg. at 66,477.
88 See 33 C.F.R. § 1.07-1 l(b)(l)-(3).
'9 See id. §§ 1.07-11 (b)(4), -11 (d).
90 See id. § 1.07-1 l(b)(5).
'l See id. § 1.07-20(a).
92 See id. § 1.07-20(b).
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hearing.93 The violator may obtain a free copy of the case file and may
examine all physical evidence.94 He also has the right to have an attorney
represent him at the hearing." The violator may present witness testimony,
"either through a personal appearance or through a written statement," and
any other evidence relevant to the allegations or an appropriate penalty.96 The
hearing officer issues a decision in writing; if she assesses a penalty, she must
base it on "substantial evidence in the record., 97 The violator then has thirty
days to appeal the penalty through the Hearing Officer to the Commandant
of the Coast Guard. 98 The procedures in subpart 1.07 of the new regulations
do not mention whether the violator has the right to cross-examine witnesses.
B. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Purpose and Goals
In the preamble to the NPRM for the field citation program, EPA
states that the field citation program will enable the Agency to respond
quickly to a wider range of violations without committing the resources
necessary for civil judicial actions.99 It will enable the Agency to address
minor violations which, due to limited resources, the Agency often chose not
to address in the past.' ° EPA hopes to create a streamlined enforcement tool
to "save agency resources, reduce backlogs, and send a clear enforcement
message to violators that minor violations will not be overlooked."'' In
9' See id. § 1.07-25(a). The hearing officer is an unbiased agency employee who can ad-
minister oaths and issue subpoenas. See id. § 1.07-15; see also id. § 1.07-5(b).
"' See id. § 1.07-30.
9' See id. § 1.07-40.
96 Id. §§ 1.07-50,-55(b).
9' See id. § 1.07-65(a).
98 See id. §§ 1.07-70(a), -75(a), -75(b).
99 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,777 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 59).
'0o See id. at 22,781.
lot Id.
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essence, it will fill a void in the CAA's enforcement scheme that the more
resource intensive enforcement tools do not address. In developing the field
citation program, EPA sought to instill three characteristics. First, it should
only issue field citations for clear-cut violations that are "truly minor in
nature."' 2 Second, it should issue field citations soon after a violation is
discovered, if not at the time of discovery.0 3 Third, the program procedures
and the penalty amounts should induce violators to promptly correct their
violations and pay their penalties.0 4
2. Defining "Minor Violations"
In devising an appropriate definition for "minor violations" EPA
considered three options. In the first option, EPA considered preparing a
comprehensive list of minor violations, but it promptly rejected the option
because it found such a list too difficult to compile.0 5 Second, EPA con-
sidered and just as quickly rejected the idea of defining "minor violations" as
violations of particular categories of regulatory requirements. 0 6 In the end,
EPA decided to define "minor violations" by compiling a list of factors that
tend to make violations minor.'°7
a. Comprehensive List of Violations
For the first approach, the Agency considered the method that the
OUST employed in developing the UST field citation program-compiling
"a comprehensive list of all possible violations suitable for field citations.' 10 8
This method would have limited inspector discretion by providing clear and
102 See id. at 22,777.
03 See id.
'o See id. In its proposed rule, EPA states that the two goals of the field citation program
are "to deter minor violations of the Act and to expedite enforcement against such viola-
tions." Id. at 22,792 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 59.1).
'o' See id. at 22,777-78.
106 See id. at 22,778.
0" See id.
'o' Id. at 22,777-78; see also supra Part IV.A. 1.
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objective criteria for issuing field citations.' °9 It also would have streamlined
further the field citation program and made it more consistent throughout the
nation.11 However, EPA felt that this method was unworkable because
"[a]lmost any violation might be considered significant or minor depending
on the circumstances.""' The Agency concluded that it could not avoid
relying on an inspector's discretion in weighing individual circumstances to
determine whether a violation is minor." 2 According to EPA, a compre-
hensive list would not guide an inspector in applying his discretion to deter-
mine whether a violation is minor."13
b. Categories of Regulatory Requirements
The Agency next considered limiting "minor violations" to specific
categories of regulatory requirements, such as "recordkeeping, reporting,
labeling, monitoring, workplace standards, etc.""' 4 However, EPA decided
that this approach suffered from the same weaknesses as the comprehensive
list option because any violation within one of the broad categories of
violations could vary in significance depending on the circumstances." 5 The
agency felt that this second approach did not provide a useful method for an
inspector to apply in determining whether a violation is minor." 6
c. List of Factors
Ultimately, EPA decided to define "minor violations" as those viola-
tions that are "minor in nature, in light of a list of factors that must be con-
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sidered as a whole."'1 17 Therefore, now EPA will consider a violation to be
minor if, for example, it is: easy to recognize; "poses little risk of environ-
mental harm;" easy to correct; infrequent and of a short duration; and does
not violate a requirement significantly important to the regulatory program. 1 8
The Agency intends to evaluate the factors as a whole and does not plan to
put specific requirements on the factors, such as specific times for the
duration of a violation or a dollar amount for the cost of correcting a
violation." 9 EPA, however, reserved the discretion to determine which
enforcement option is appropriate in any particular case.120 In addition, EPA
declined to give any violator the right to claim that, since a violation is minor
in nature, EPA has no enforcement option other than to issue a field cita-
tion. 21 The Agency states in the NPRM: "A violation is not a minor viola-
tion under the definition proposed today unless it is minor in nature as
described above, and unless the Agency, in its discretion, decides to address
it as a minor violation.' ' 122 The EPA plans to describe in more detail the pro-
cess for determining whether a violation is minor in a subsequent guidance
", Id. The proposed rule states:
The following factors shall be considered in determining whether a
violation is minor under the Act:
(1) Whether the violation is readily recognizable;
(2) Risk of environmental harm;
(3) Time required to correct the violation;
(4) Effort required to correct the violation;
(5) Expense required to correct the violation;
(6) Frequency of the violation;
(7) Duration of the violation;
(8) Importance of the violated requirement to the specific
program; and
(9) Other factors as appropriate.
Criminal violations shall not be addressed through issuance of field citations.
Id. at 22,792 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)).








3. Maximum Penalty Amount
In the NPRM, EPA proposes a maximum penalty of $5000 per day
"for each separate violation cited in the field citation."' 24 EPA believes that
case law, the program's underlying intent, and the Act's legislative history all
support this interpretation.
25
The Agency argues that it has a long history of applying the same
interpretation to a similar provision in the pre-1990 CAA section 113(b). 126
It reasons that Congress, by adopting this language for section 113(d)(3) in
the 1990 amendments, "clearly authorized EPA to continue this interpretation
for purposes of the new field citation program."'127 The Agency points out
that the courts construing pre-1990 section 113(b) have supported the
Agency's "per day, per each separate violation" interpretation in several
decisions.'28
According to EPA, its interpretation is also consistent with Con-
gress's underlying intent.129 The Agency asserts that Congress intended to
"provide EPA with a flexible enforcement tool that [will] focus on the less
23 See id.
121 Id.; see also id. at 22,792 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 59.5(b)).
121 See id. at 27,778-79.
126 See id. at 22,778. Under the 1977 version of the CAA, the relevant portion of section
113(b) stated: "The Administrator shall ... in the case of any person that is the owner or
operator of a major stationary source, and may, in the case of any other person, commence
a civil action ... to assess and recover a civil penalty of not more than $25,000 per day of
violation .... 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994)).
Compare with the relevant portion of 1990 CAA section 113(d)(3) which states: "The
Administrator may implement... a field citation program through regulations establishing
field citations assessing civil penalties not to exceed $5,000 per day of violation may be
issued .... 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
27 Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,778-79.
128 See id. The Agency cited two district court cases: United States v. SCM Corp., 667
F. Supp. 110 (D. Md. 1987) and United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 770
(W.D. Tex. 1985). See id. at 22,779 n.4.
29 See id. at 22,779.
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significant, presumably simpler and less complex violations, with assessment
of significantly lower penalties than expected through [the] two other civil
penalty provisions of section 113, administrative penalty orders (section
S13(d)(1)) and judicial civil penalty actions (section 113(b))."' 3 ° The Agency
argues that its interpretation will result in significantly lower penalties than
under the other two programs "because of the large reduction in the
maximum penalty from $25,000 to $5,000, the minor nature of the violations,
and the penalty assessment criteria in section 1 13(e)."'' Additionally, EPA
argues that its approach for the maximum penalty amount for each violation
allows the Agency to "fairly and flexibly implement a field citation program
in a manner consistent with Congress' apparent objectives ... ."'32 It
suggests that a more restrictive approach that would limit the maximum
penalty to $5000 per day, regardless of the number of violations, may hinder
these goals.'33 Such an approach would limit the Agency's ability to account
for differences between violators when assessing penalties because, for
example, two violators with different numbers of penalties would face the
same maximum penalty.'34 This approach may drive EPA to issue more
administrative orders for multiple violations in lieu of field citations in order
to achieve a fair result.13
5
The Agency believes that the subsection's legislative history, though
130 Id.
Id. The pertinent portion of CAA section 1 13(e)(1) states:
In determining the amount of any penalty to be assessed under this
section .... the Administrator or the court, as appropriate, shall take into
consideration (in addition to such other factors as justice may require) the
size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business,
the violator's full compliance history and good faith efforts to comply, the
duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence
(including evidence other than the applicable test method), payment by the
violator of penalties previously assessed for the same violation, the
economic benefit of noncompliance, and the seriousness of the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1) (1994).






limited, supports its interpretation.1 36 First, Congress implicitly approved
EPA's interpretation when it adopted language the Agency had consistently
interpreted to mean $5000 per day for each violation.1 37 Second, EPA points
to the Senate's legislative history on the amendment. The original Senate bill
authorized a maximum civil penalty of "$5,000 per day for each violation." '
The Senate eventually passed a bill that, instead, provided for a maximum
civil peaalty of "$5,000 per inspection."'' 39  The conference committee,
however, rejected the Senate's "$5,000 per inspection" language in favor of
"$5,000 per day of violation." 4 ' Finally, EPA argues that the legislative
history of Title II's (Emission Standards for Moving Sources) enforcement
provisions supports their interpretation. 4' The Senate Committee on Envi-
ronment and Public Works reported that the language it proposed for section
21 l(d)(1) of the CAA, which provided for maximum penalties of "$25,000
per day of violation," applied to each day for each violation. 4 2 According to
EPA, this legislative history shows that Congress intended for the term "per
day of violation" to mean "per day for each violation."14 3
In order to limit the penalty amount for each violation and to provide
greater uniform structure for the field citation program, EPA proposed
limiting each citation to a maximum cumulative penalty amount in the range
136 See id.
137 See id.
'3 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 102-228, at 550 (1989)).
'3 See id. (citing S. 1630, 101st Cong. (1990)).
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. (citing S. REP. No. 101-228, at 126 (1989)). The pertinent portion of CAA
section 21 l(d)(1) now states:
Any person who violates subsection (a), (f), (g), (k), (1), (m), or (n) of this
section or regulations prescribed under subsection (c), (h), (i), (k), (1), (m),
or (n) of this section or who fails to furnish any information or conduct
any tests required by the Administrator under subsection (b) of this section
shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than the
sum of $25,000 for every day of such violation and the amount of
economic benefit or savings resulting from the violation.
42 U.S.C. § 7545(d)(1) (1994).
4 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,779.
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of $15,000 to $25,000.'" EPA, however, is considering ending, or "sun-
setting," the cap after a certain period of time ranging between one to two
years or longer.145 Finally, EPA plans to develop detailed guidance to
implement its policy to impose penalties that are "significant enough to deter
violations and to ensure a high rate of compliance."' 14 6 The Agency intends
to establish the penalty assessment guidance for evaluating the section 113(e)
penalty assessment criteria for determining penalty amounts. 147 The Agency
also may issue guidance that will standardize "penalty amounts [for] specific
categories of violations."''4 8 This guidance may involve creating a "penalty
matrix" that will address such factors as violation seriousness, degree of
environmental harm, and other appropriate criteria. 1
49
4. Program Guidance
In addition to creating guidance for determining when violations are
minor and for assessing penalties, EPA plans to develop detailed guidance
to implement several other aspects of the field citation program.' 50 For
example, the proposed guidance will address when investigators should issue
citations in the field and when they should issue them from an EPA office.'5'
The program guidance will also cover such issues as: coordinating inspec-
tions with state and local officials, how to revoke field citations, how to
record and track field citations, how to complete field citation forms, and
... See id. at 22,780.
'4 See id.
I46 1d. The agency believes that, since it has very few inspectors to actively enforce the
program or conduct follow-up inspections, it needs a maximum penalty amount to deter
violations. See Telephone interview with Cary Secrest, Environmental Protection Specialist,
Stationary Source Compliance Division, Office of Air and Radiation, United States
Environmental Protection Agency (May 24, 1995).








5. Role of the States
According to EPA, section 113(d)(3) does not authorize the Admini-
strator to delegate the field citation program to state or local officials. 53 The
subsection provides that "officers or employees designated by the Admini-
strator" may issue field citations. 54 Thus, only EPA employees will issue
field citations under the new program. 55 However, EPA plans for its em-
ployees and officers to issue field citations based on information gathered by
state and local inspectors.156 The Agency believes that this reliance on state
obtained information will be the only effective way to apply the program
because the States conduct the overwhelming majority of inspections.'57
6. Hearing Procedures
EPA discusses in the NPRM three alternative procedures for govern-
ing hearings on field citations: consolidated APA penalty assessment pro-
cedures under 40 C.F.R. pt. 22; consolidated non-APA procedures under 40
C.F.R. pt. 28; and new streamlined procedures under the part 59 proposal.'58
Although section 113(d)(3) states that the hearing shall not be subject to APA
style hearing procedures, it requires the agency to afford persons "a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present evidence."' 59 The Agency
interprets this provision as giving it wide discretion in selecting hearing
procedures, including APA adjudication procedures. 60 However, in order to
152 See id. at 22,781.
's' See id. at 22,780.
114 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
t See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,781.
56 See id. at 22,780.
'57 See Telephone Interview with Jane Engert, Environmental Scientist, Office of Com-
pliance, United States Environmental Protection Agency (May 24, 1995).
' See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,781.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3).
6 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,782.
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deter violations and minimize the drain on the Agency's resources, EPA
intends to select the procedures that are quick and inexpensive. 6 Under the
proposed part 59 procedures, the presiding officer will be an impartial agency
employee who may not necessarily be a lawyer. 6 2 After the hearing, the
presiding officer will recommend a decision to the Regional Administrator'63
based on "substantial evidence in the administrative record."'" The Regional
Administrator may then either "affirm, reverse, modify, or remand the case
to the Presiding Officer for further proceedings."' 65 The Regional Admini-
strator's order becomes final agency action in thirty days unless the Envi-
ronmental Appeals Board ("EAB") suspends the order pursuant to its sua
sponte review authority.'66 Ultimately, all penalty payments will go directly
to the United States Treasury. 167
7. Federal Facilities
The preamble of the NPRM does not mention federal agencies or
facilities. However, in its proposal for section 59.7 (Issuance and service of
field citations), EPA proposes to serve process on federal agencies "in the
manner prescribed by the applicable law for service of process."'' 68 This
proposal indicates that EPA intends to issue field citations to federal facili-
ties. Unfortunately, the NPRM does not offer any legal or policy arguments
supporting EPA's apparent plan to apply the field citation program to federal
agencies. This is not surprising because, while preparing its proposal, EPA
did not fully consider the issue. 169
161 See id. at 22,789.
62 See id. at 22,787.
'6' See id. at 22,788.
164 Id. at 22,795 (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. § 59.22).
165 Id. at 22,788.
166 See id.
67 See id. at 22,795.
168 Id. at 22,792-93.
169 See Telephone Interview with Cary Secrest, Environmental Protection Specialist, Air





A. Defining "Minor Violations"
Before implementing a field citation program, EPA must first
promulgate regulations defining "minor violations." In section 113(d)(3) of
the Act, Congress authorized the Administrator to "implement ... a field
citation program through regulations establishing appropriate minor viola-
tions for which field citations... may be issued ... "70 In the NPRM, EPA
proposes to define "minor violations" as those violations that are "minor in
nature" considering a list of factors.'71 The Agency rejected two other
alternative methods as unworkable, in part because the Agency decided that
it could not avoid giving inspectors some degree of discretion in determining
whether a violation under the circumstances is a minor violation.'72 In doing
this, EPA rejected the approach it applied under the UST field citation
program. Under the UST field citation program, EPA limited its employees'
discretion by compiling a comprehensive list of violations from which the
regions could choose in establishing their field citation programs.'73 The
regions could not list violations that were not on the headquarters' master
list.'74 The Agency did this because it had discovered from experience that
field citation programs with easily identifiable violations are the most
effective.'75 Lists of violations provide clear guidance to inspectors. They
enable the program to rely less on inspector discretion, and they facilitate
program consistency.'76 However, the UST field citation program enforces
fewer and less complex requirements than what the CAA's field citation
program will enforce. Thus, EPA believes that it will be neither easy nor
practicable to devise a comprehensive list of minor violations for the CAA
7o 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
'7' See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,778; see also supra note 117.
172 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. at 22,778.
' See DIR. No. 9610.16, supra note 63, at 5-6.
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field citation program. 177
Much of the regulated community and several states do not agree with
EPA's approach in defining "minor violations." The American Feed Industry
Association, the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, the Department of Defense, and the Northeast States
for Coordinated Air Use Management submitted comments to the proposed
rule suggesting that EPA compile comprehensive lists of appropriate
violations and/or categories of violations.
78
The American Feed Industry Association ("AFIA") 179 believes that
EPA must develop a list of minor violations to ensure that the program is
consistent throughout the nation and fair to industry. 180 The members argue
that many companies operate facilities in different areas, and to be consistent
in managing their environmental compliance programs, these companies need
to know that "what constitutes a minor violation in Kansas will also be
interpreted as a minor violation in Nebraska."''
The Utility Air Regulatory Group ("UARG") 82 believes that EPA's
definition for "minor violations" is too open-ended to be workable.'83 It
argues that the Agency's definition will give too much discretion to in-
spectors, create inconsistency among the regions, engender confusion and
' See Secrest Interview, supra note 169.
... See infra notes 179, 182, 194, 203.
179 The AFIA is a national trade association for livestock and poultry feed manufacturers
and ingredient suppliers. More than 700 companies and 3000 individual establishments are
AFIA members. They produce and sell more than 70% of the nation's livestock and poultry
feed. See American Feed Industry Association Comments to the Field Citation Program at
1 (June 30, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No.
06) [hereinafter AFIA Comments].
8 See id. at 3.
SI Id.
82 The Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) is a voluntary group of over 70 electrical
utilities, including the Potomac Electric Power Company ("PEPCO"), which participates
collectively in federal CAA rulemaking and related litigation that may affect the electric
utility industry. See Utility Air Regulatory Group Comments to the Field Citation Program
at 1 (July 8, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No.
46) [hereinafter UARG Comments].
113 See id. at 8.
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uncertainty in the regulated community, and result in fewer settlements. 84
It also argues that EPA's plan to use information from state and local
inspections will exacerbate the confusion in the regulated community. 85 The
UARG suggests that EPA develop a "list or matrix of specific minor
violations and narrowly defined categories."'816 This listing will make the
program similar to a local traffic enforcement program, and it will foster
consistency throughout the nation, enable the agency to easily compile
statistics on categories of violations, and encourage violators to promptly pay
penalties and correct their violations.8 7 Finally, the UARG suggests that
EPA can revise its list/matrix as the program progresses. 88
The Chemical Manufacturers Association ("CMA")189 supports EPA's
approach of basing a general definition of "minor violations" on a list of
several factors.'9" However, CMA is concerned that EPA will fail to give its
inspectors the discretion to decide not to issue citations for truly de minimis
violations.' 9' It also wants an inspector to be able to consider a facility's
efforts to identify and promptly address environmental problems. 9 2 It argues
that the "no penalty" option is essential to encourage facilities to audit and
evaluate their environmental compliance programs. 193
Both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA")
and the Department of Defense ("DOD") believe that the factors that EPA
184 See id.
.85 See id. at 8 n.9.
186 Id. at 9.
187 See id.
188 See id.
89 The CMA is a trade association of companies which produce over 90% of the nation's
industrial chemicals. See Chemical Manufacturers Association Comments to the Field
Citation Program at 4 (July 8, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-
D, Comment No. 51) [hereinafter CMA Comments].
'90 See id. at 6.
'9' See id. at 7.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 7-8.
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relies upon for defining "minor violations" are too vague and ambiguous. '94
They both argue that this ambiguity leaves too much discretion to the
inspectors.'95 NASA believes that EPA is making a mistake by trying to
instantly implement a comprehensive program.'96 It suggests that EPA list
minor violations by subject categories.' 97 The Agency can modify periodi-
cally the lists as the field citation program evolves and both EPA and the
regulated community gain experience with the program.'98 The DOD wants
EPA to either compile a comprehensive list of minor violations or fully
explain each of the defining factors in the rule. 9 9 For example, DOD points
out that a violation that is "readily recognizable" may be either serious or
minor depending on the context. 200 Also, a violation that requires con-
siderable effort and expense to correct may minimally impact air quality and
involve minor regulatory requirements.2 °' If EPA does not fully explain each
defining factor, the rule will lack objective guidance; it will create a program
that treats violators inconsistently and inequitably.02
The Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management
("NESCAUM") °3 believes that the factors that EPA intends to apply in
4 See Department of Defense Comments to the Field Citation Program at 6-7 (July 1,
1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 11)
[hereinafter DOD Comments]; National Aeronautics and Space Administration Comments
to the Field Citation Program at 2 (July 5, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63,
Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 22) [hereinafter NASA Comments].
" See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 6-7; NASA Comments, supra note 194, at 2.
196 See NASA Comments, supra note 194, at 2.
197 See id.
I98 See id.
'9 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 6-7.
200 See id.
"01 See id.
202 See id. at 7.
20' NESCAUM represents the Connecticut Bureau of Air Management, the Maine Bureau
of Air Quality Control, the Massachusetts Division of Air Quality Control, the New
Hampshire Air Resources Division, the New Jersey Office of Energy, the New York Division
of Air Resources, the Rhode Island Division of Air and Hazardous Materials, and the
Vermont Air Pollution Control Division. See Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
Management Comments to the Field Citation Program at 1 (July 8, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air
Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 48) [hereinafter NESCAUM
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defining "minor violations" are too broad and will ultimately undermine state
compliance and enforcement programs.2" The member states note that under
EPA's approach, EPA inspectors will issue citations without considering
state enforcement actions. 205 They want EPA to devise a comprehensive list
of minor violations and to define specific categories of regulatory require-
ments appropriate for field citations .206 According to NESCAUM, this
approach will produce a nationally consistent enforcement program.2 °7 It also
will improve overall compliance by enabling EPA to target source categories
and better coordinate its activities with state agencies.0 8
Perhaps EPA is correct when it says that it can not practicably develop
a comprehensive list of appropriate minor violations or categories.2 9 Such
a list of potential minor violations may be unwieldy. However, EPA has
selected an approach that is not optimum for achieving its goals for the field
citation program. A comprehensive list of minor violations will do more to
deter minor violations because the regulated community will know which
problems to look for and address. Additionally, a comprehensive list will
enable inspectors to respond quickly in the field because an inspector will not
have to weigh numerous factors before deciding whether to issue a field
citation. A list with enumerated penalties will significantly discourage
violators from challenging their citations. Since the regulations will set the
penalty amount, the violators will only be able to challenge whether they
violated a requirement. Also, a comprehensive list will lead to greater
national uniformity and fairness. As the AFIA noted, it will provide a level
playing field for companies to compete in the national market.2 t" Finally, a
comprehensive list of appropriate violations will help create a true field
citation program where inspectors can issue citations in the field for pre-
determined violations and pre-determined penalty amounts.
Comments].





209 See supra Part IV.B.2.
2"0 See AFIA Comments, supra note 179, at 3.
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B. Maximum Penalty Amount
The EPA proposes applying a maximum penalty of $5000 per day for
each violation and applying a temporary cap in the range of $15,000 to
$25,000 per citation.2 ' The Agency argues that case law, the program's
underlying intent, and the amendment's legislative history support its
interpretation.212 However, the vast majority of the private companies and
federal agencies who commented on EPA's proposal challenge EPA's
interpretation for the maximum penalty amount.213 These critical comments
typically raise three arguments. First, critics argue that the case law does not
support EPA's interpretation.1 4 Second, they argue that the language in CAA
section 113(d)(3) clearly provides that the maximum penalty may not exceed
"$5,000 per day of violation," not "$5,000 per day for each violation." 215
Congress amended the language in section 113(b) to provide for a maximum
penalty of"no more than $25,000 per day for each violation" for civil judicial
actions.216 The critics argue that "[s]ince Congress included that language in
[section] 113(b) and at the same time included other, more restrictive
language in [section] 1 13(d)(3), Congress intended that total daily penalties
2 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,778, 22,780 (1994) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59).
212 See id. at 22,778.
"13 These commentators included the Steel Manufacturers Association, the UARG, the
Duquesne Light Company, the CMA, the Clean Air Implementation Project, the DOD, the
Coalition for Clean Air Implementation, and the Washington Legal Foundation.
214 See Coalition for Clean Air Implementation Comments to the Field Citation Program
at 5-6 (July 8, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No.
50) [hereinafter Coalition Comments]; CMA Comments, supra note 189, at 15-16;
Washington Legal Foundation Comments to the Field Citation Program at 2-3 (July 12,
1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 56)
[hereinafter Legal Foundation Comments].
215 See Coalition Comments, supra note 214, at 4; CMA Comments, supra note 189, at 9;
Legal Foundation Comments, supra note 214, at 1-2.
216 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994).
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for the field citation not exceed $5,000. '2"7 Finally, the critics argue that the
legislative history of the amendment indicates that Congress intended to limit
the total daily penalties to $5000.218
1. The Case Law
In the preamble to the proposed rule, EPA argues that two federal
district court decisions support their interpretation.1 9 While both cases dealt
with similar language in section 113(b) under the 1977 version of the CAA,22°
neither case directly addressed the issue.
a. United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
In United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,2 ' the State of Texas and
EPA sought civil judicial penalties against Chevron for violating the State's
implementation plan ("SIP") 22 and EPA's prevention of significant
deterioration ("PSD") regulations.223 Chevron, while operating a refinery in
El Paso, Texas, violated three Texas Air Control Board ("TACB") rules that
217 UARG Comments, supra note 182, at 11 (citing Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) ("Congress acts 'intentionally and purposely' when it
'includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another."').
218 See Coalition Comments, supra note 214, at 7; CMA Comments, supra note 189, at 10-
14;.Legal Foundation Comments, supra note 214, at 2.
29 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,779 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 59) (citing United States v. SCM Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Md. 1987) and
United States v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Tex. 1985)).
220 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988); see also supra note 126.
221 639 F. Supp. 770 (W.D. Tex. 1985).
222 Clean Air Act section 1 10(a)(1) requires each state to develop, adopt, and submit to
EPA for approval, a SIP to implement, maintain, and enforce each national ambient air
quality standard ("NAAQS") in that state. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (1994). For sta-
tionary sources, each SIP must establish emission limitations, compliance schedules, and any
additional measures necessary to attain and maintain NAAQS. See id. § 741 0(a)(2). On May
31, 1972 EPA approved Texas' SIP. See Chevron, 639 F. Supp. at 775.
223 See Chevron, 639 F. Supp. at 776-77; 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1997).
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were part of the SIP. 224 Additionally, Chevron had failed to apply for a
permit to modify an existing facility in violation of EPA's PSD regu-
lations. 225 The court found that Chevron had violated the state and federal
regulations between October 1, 1977 and March 6, 1979.226 It found that
Chevron had violated TACB rule 201.06 (limiting sulfur dioxide con-
centrations) 991 times, TACB rule 201.09 (limiting sulfur dioxide ground
level concentrations) eleven times, and both the PSD regulation and TACB
rule 601 (requiring stationary sources to apply for permits before constructing
or modifying facilities) for 552 days.227 The court did not specifically address
the issue of whether the maximum limit of "$25,000 per day of violation"
meant "per day of violation for each violation." However, it fined Chevron,
pursuant to CAA section 113(b), $4000 for each of its 991 violations of the
PSD regulation. 22' The court imposed a total penalty of $4,530,000 under
section 113(b), amounting to $8,206.52 per day for 552 days.229
b. United States v. SCM Corp.
In United States v. SCM Corp. 230 EPA sought penalties under CAA
section 113(b) against SCM Corporation for violating the State of Maryland's
224 The three rules included TACB rule 201.06, which limited the concentration of sulfur
dioxide emissions; TACB rule 201.09, which limited the net ground level concentration of
sulfur dioxide; and TACB rule 60, which required facilities emitting any air contaminant to
obtain permits before constructing any new facility or modifying any existing facility. See
Chevron, 639 F. Supp. at 775.
225 See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 52.2 1(d)(3)).
226 See id.
227 See id. at 777-79.
228 See id. at 779. In total, the court imposed the following fines: $5000 for each of the
991 TACB rule 201.06 violations-$4000 each to the United States and $1000 each to the
State of Texas; $5000 for each of the 11 TACB rule 201.09 violations-$4000 each to the
United States and $1000 each to the State of Texas; $1000 to the State of Texas for each of
the 552 days Chevron violated TACB rule 601; and $1000 to the United States for each of
the 552 days Chevron violated the PSD regulations. See id.
229 See id. at 779-80.
230 667 F. Supp. 1110 (D. Md. 1987).
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SIP limitations for particulate matter and sulfuric acid mist.23" ' The parties
presented only two questions of law to the court. First, could the court
impose civil penalties for violations occurring before EPA issued a NOV to
SCM Corporation?232 Second, once regulators show that a source is out of
compliance, does the source have the burden of proving that it has achieved
compliance? 233 The court held that civil penalties were available for the
violations occurring before EPA issued the NOV, but not for violations
outside the five year statute of limitations.234 It also held that in enforcement
proceedings under the CAA, the government has the burden of proving
violations of applicable regulations.2 35 The court found that EPA had proven
fourteen daily violations of the SIP limits for particulate matter and sixteen
daily violations of the SIP limits for sulfuric acid mist.236 The court stated
that the maximum available penalty for the thirty days of violations was
$750,000 (thirty multiplied by $25,000).237 The court subsequently fined
SCM Corporation a total penalty of $350,000.238
The district courts in both cases did not rule directly on the issue of
whether the language of section 113(b) provided for penalties of $25,000 per
day of violation for each violation, but neither court disputed EPA's
interpretation. In fact, the court in SCM Corp. applied EPA's interpretation
when it calculated the possible maximum penalty as $25,000 per day of
violation for each violation. 239 However, neither court actually imposed a
penalty that exceeded $25,000 per day.
231 See id. at 1112.
232 See id. at 1121-22.
233 See id. at 1123.
234 See id. at 1122-23.
235 See id. at 1124 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)).
236 See id. at 1125-26. On seven dates, SCM Corporation had violated both particulate
matter and sulfuric acid mist limits. See id.
237 See id. at 1126.
238 See id. at 1128.
239 See id. at 1125.
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2. The Language of the Amendment
Section 113 of the Act provides EPA with three enforcement
opportunities to impose civil penalties. Section 113(b) authorizes EPA to
commence a civil judicial action to assess "a civil penalty of not more than
$25,000 per day for each violation., 24 Section 113(d)(1) authorizes EPA to
assess "a civil administrative penalty of up to $25,000 per day of
violation. '24' Lastly, section 113(d)(3) authorizes the Administrator to
implement "a field citation program through regulations establishing minor
violations for which field citations assessing civil penalties not to exceed
$5,000 per day of violation may be issued .... 24 As discussed above,
section 113(b) of the 1977 version of the CAA authorized civil judicial
penalties of up to "$25,000 per day of violation. 243 In 1990, when Congress
amended section 113(b) to authorize civil judicial penalties of "$25,000 per
day of violation for each violation," it did not provide the same language for
civil penalties sections 1 13(d)(1) and (3). The amended language of section
113(b) indicates that Congress knew how it should draft language autho-
rizing separate daily maximums for each violation. Therefore, Congress must
have intentionally omitted language authorizing a maximum penalty of
"$5,000 per day of violation for each violation" in section 113(d)(3). 214
240 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994).
241 Id. § 7413(d)(1).
242 Id. § 7413(d)(3).
243 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) (1994)); supra
note 126; see also discussion infra Part IV.B.3.
24 See Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 388 (1994) ("'[I]t is gen-
erally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely' when it 'includes particular
language in one section of a statute but omits it in another."') (quoting Keene Corp. v. United
States, 508 U.S. 200, 208 (1993)); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)
("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and
purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.") (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo,
472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
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3. The Legislative History
The legislative history for the 1990 amendments to the CAA is not
completely clear about whether Congress intended for the maximum penalty
for a field citation to be $5000 per day for each violation. Originally, the
EPA proposed the concept of a field citation program in the amendments to
the CAA that the Bush administration introduced in 1989.245 In his proposa!
to amend the CAA, President George Bush proposed authorizing the
Administrator to implement a field citation program with "civil penalties not
to exceed $5,000 per day for each violation.2 46 Additionally, the President
also proposed amending the civil judicial enforcement subsection, section
113(b), to allow for maximum penalties of "$25,000 per day for each
violation.,
24 7
The original version of the House of Representatives' bill included the
President's language. It proposed to authorize the Administrator to im-
plement a field citation program with maximum penalties of "$5,000 per day
for each violation. 248 The original version also proposed to amend section
113(b) of the CAA to provide for civil judicial penalties of up to "$25,000
per day for each violation., 249 The House Committee on Energy and
Commerce changed the language for the field citation program to limit the
maximum penalty for field citations to "$5,000 per day of violation., 250 The
Committee retained the civil judicial enforcement language which provided
245 See Secrest Interview, supra note 169.
246 H.R. DOC. No. 101-87, at 265 (1989).
241 See id. at 257.
248 See H.R. 3030, 101st Cong. 283 (1989), reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND
PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS
OF 1990, at 1809, 4019 (1993).
249 See id. at 281, reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 1809, 4017
(1993).
250 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-490, at 479 (1990), reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T
AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 1809, 3503 (1993).
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for penalties up to "$25,000 per day for each violation."25'
The Senate bill also began by limiting field citation penalties to
"$5,000 per day [of violation] for each violation., 252 The Senate Environ-
ment and Public Works Committee summarized the field citation proposal in
the bill as limiting field citations to "$5,000 per day for each violation., 253
However, while discussing the bill the Committee stated: "Civil penalties
assessed in a field citation are to be specified by the regulations and may not
exceed $5,000 per day of violation." '254 Additionally, the Senate bill included
the President's proposal to amend section 1 13(b) to allow for civil judicial
penalties of "$25,000 per day for each violation., 25 5 The Senate ultimately
passed a bill which limited field citation penalties to "$5,000 per inspection,"
and limited civil judicial penalties to $25,000 during any six month period for
a single facility.256 Ultimately, the Conference Committee adopted the
House's language limiting field citations to "$5,000 per day of violation." '257
Unfortunately, the Conference Committee did not explain what "$5,000 per
day of violation" meant.
' See id. at 475, reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 1809, 3499
(1993).
252 See S. 1630, 101st Cong. § 301(h) (1989), reprinted in 5 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T
AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 7339, 9192-93 (1993).
25 See S. REP. No. 101-228, at 360 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3743.
254 Id. at 365, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3748.
25 See S. 1630, 101st Cong. § 301(f) (1989), reprinted in 5 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T
AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 7339, 9184-85 (1993).
256 See id. § 601(i), reprinted in 3 SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 103D
CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 4119,
4723 (1993).
257 See 150 CONG. REC. S16,933 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (Chafee-Baucus Statement of
Senate Managers), reprinted in I SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG.,
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 3, 942 (1993).
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4. The Maximum Penalty Should Be $5000 per Day
At first glance, it appears that Congress has left to EPA the task of
determining what "per day of violation" means." 8 However, the language is
not ambiguous-"per day of violation" means for each day of violation.259
Congress provided clear language in the civil judicial enforcement provision
of section 113 when it wanted to set a maximum penalty for each separate
violation. Additionally, a maximum penalty of $5000 per day for each
violation will not further the program's goal of achieving prompt settlements;
instead, it will lead to more complex field citations with higher penalty
amounts. Consequently, recipients more readily will challenge these ex-
pensive penalties, hoping at least to reduce the penalty amounts. EPA,
therefore, should limit its penalty amounts to encourage prompt settlements.
It should cap its penalties at $5000 per day, with a total penalty not to exceed
$25 ,000.260
C. Agency Guidance
In the NPRM, EPA states that it intends to issue additional guidance
on a variety of matters, including guidance to describe the process for
determining whether a violation is minor.2 1 The Agency will develop gui-
dance to help inspectors determine when to issue field citations and when to
25 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (stating that if a statute is ambiguous or silent on a specific issue and Congress has
empowered an agency to administer the statute, a court should defer to the agency's
reasonable interpretation of the statute).
259 The definition of "per" is: "[t]o, for, or by each: for every ($12 dollars per hour)."
WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 871 (1984).
260 Twenty-five thousand dollars is a logical limit for field citations under section
S13(d)(3). Section 1 13(d)(1) authorizes EPA to assess, for certain serious violations of the
Act, civil administrative penalties of up to $25,000 per day of violation, not to exceed a total
penalty of $200,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (1994).
261 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,778 (1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 59).
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employ other enforcement tools.262 The Agency expects to issue guidelines
for determining whether to issue a citation in the field or from an EPA
office.263 Other guidance will cover such areas as coordinating inspections
with state and local officials, calculating penalty amounts, revoking citations,
and recording and tracking citations. 26' The Agency also will issue guidance
to "explain how the Agency intends to evaluate the penalty assessment
criteria in section 113(e) of the Act when determining penalty amounts. 265
This extensive list of topics for internal agency guidance raises an interesting
issue-whether the Agency is evading its responsibility to implement the
field citation program through rulemaking.
Section 1 13(d)(3) authorizes the Administrator to "implement ... a
field citation program through regulations establishing appropriate minor
violations for which field citations ... may be issued by officers or em-
ployees designated by the Administrator. 2 66 As discussed above, CAA
section 307(d)(1)(P) requires EPA to submit any field citation program
regulations to public review and comment rulemaking procedures.267 The
issue is whether the "guidelines" will constitute rules which the Agency must
also promulgate through rulemaking. These "guidelines" may be interpre-
tative rules, policy statements, or procedural rules; or, they may be
substantive or legislative rules.268 If they are substantive or legislative rules,
EPA must promulgate them through the appropriate section 307(d)
rulemaking procedures.2 69 The Agency, however, does not have to employ
262 See id. at 22,780.
263 See id.
264 See id. at 22,781.
265 Id. at 22,780.
266 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994).
267 See id. § 7607(d)(1)(P); see also supra note 52.
268 See generally 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 6.1-.10 (3d ed. 1994).
269 The pertinent portion of CAA section 307(d)(1) states:
The provisions of section 553 through 557 and section 706 of title 5 shall
not, except as expressly provided in this subsection, apply to actions to
which this subsection applies. This subsection shall not apply in the case
of any rule or circumstance referred to in subparagraphs (A) or (B) of
subsection 553(b) of title 5.
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the section 307(d) rulemaking procedures if the guidelines are interpretative
rules, general statements of policy, or rules of procedure or practice.27° The
trick is determining whether a guideline is a substantive/legislative or an
interpretative rule.
An interpretative rule clarifies or explains an existing law or
requirement, while a substantive rule creates a law, a requirement, or
otherwise significantly effects private rights.2 7' An interpretative rule does
42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1). Section 553 of Title 5 contains the rulemaking procedures of the
APA, which is codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335,
5372, 7521 (1994). Section 553 provides in part:
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the
Federal Register .... The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule mak-
ing proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is pro-
posed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a de-
scription of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does
not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules
of agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the
finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the rules
issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are imprac-
ticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules
are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency
hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c).
270 See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 268, §§ 6.2-.4, at 228, 234, 248.
27 See United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347-48 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that a
U.S. Park Service rule prohibiting storage of excessive property was not an interpretative rule
but was a substantive rule because it imposed an additional condition upon the public); I
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 268, §§ 6.3-.4, at 233-50.
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not bind the Agency, the public, or the courts; whereas a substantive or legi-
slative rule does.2 " Like interpretative rules, policy statements also do not
bind the Agency or the public; nor do they create any rights or obligations.273
If a guideline denies a decision maker the discretion to entertain challenges
to the guideline's position, it is binding and therefore a legislative rule.274
Thus, EPA will have to submit any guideline to the public review and
comment procedures if the guideline does any of the following: creates
requirements or obligations; significantly affects private rights; attempts to
bind the Agency or the public; or does not permit a decision maker the
discretion to entertain a challenge to the guideline's position.
Undoubtedly, most of the guidelines EPA plans to develop for the
field citation program will not be legislative rules. Guidelines that help
inspectors determine whether to issue field citations or employ other enforce-
ment options will not be legislative rules if they do not bind the inspectors to
specific options. The Agency will not need to submit to public review and
comment its guidance for coordinating inspections and for recording and
tracking field citations because these guidelines will cover agency procedure
and practice. 275 However, the Agency will need to consult with the states in
preparing its guidance for coordinating inspections with state and local
authorities.276 Most important, any guidelines that establish set procedures
for determining what are "minor violations" or how to calculate penalty
amounts are likely to be substantive or legislative rules because these types
272 See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 268, § 6.3, at 233-34.
273 See McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
McLouth Steel petitioned EPA to delist its waste sludge from the Agency's hazardous waste
list. According to its policy, the Agency applied a vertical and horizontal spread ("VHS")
model to predict the sludge's hazardous waste leachate levels. EPA denied the petition
because of the VHS model results. The Court found that EPA had used the VHS model as
a "binding norm." Thus, it was a legislative rule which EPA should have submitted to the
public review and comment procedures of the APA. See id. at 1324.
274 See id. at 1320.
275 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 267, 270.
276 Section 1 13(d)(3) of the CAA requires the Administrator to consult with the states prior




of guidelines tend to deny decision makers discretion and will substantially
affect private interests. Thus, the Agency must submit them to the public
review and comment procedures.
D. The Role of the States
In the NPRM, EPA reads section 1 13(d)(3) as not authorizing the
Administrator to delegate the field citation program to state or local
agencies.277 However, even though state and local officials may not issue
field citations under the program, "EPA employees may rely on information
gathered during State and local inspections as a basis for issuing field
citations." '78 The Agency believes that the field citation program will need
to rely upon state and local inspection information because the state and local
agencies perform the vast majority of the inspections.27 9 Several states
objected to EPA's conclusion that the Administrator cannot delegate to the
states the authority to issue field citations.2 8° The states argue that the statute
does not define "officers" or "employees" and that section 113(d)(3) does not
expressly preclude the Administrator from delegating to state and local
officials the authority to issue field citations.2"' The states believe that their
interpretation is reasonable because Congress recognized in CAA section
101(a)(3) that air pollution prevention and control is the primary respon-
277 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,781 (1994). The Agency notes
that "[u]nder the Act, field citations 'may be issued by officers or employees designated by
the Administrator."' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3)).
278 Id. at 22,780.
279 See Telephone Interview with Jane Engert, Environmental Scientist, Office of Com-
pliance, United States Environmental Protection Agency (May 25, 1995).
280 See State and Territorial Air Pollution Program Administrators and the Association of
Local Air Pollution Control Officials ("STAPPA/ALAPCO") Comments to the Field Citation
Program at 4-5 (July 5, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D,
Comment No. 10) [hereinafter STAPPA/ALAPCO Comments]; State of Tennessee
Department of Environment and Conservation Comments to the Field Citation Program at
1-2 (June 28, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No.
19); NESCAUM Comments, supra note 203, at 1.
281 See STAPPA/ALAPCO Comments, supra note 280, at 5.
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sibility of the state and local governments.282 However, the amendment's
legislative history does not support the states' argument. In discussing the
language, which Congress ultimately adopted, the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce reported:
The citations are to be issued by Federal officers or em-
ployees designated by EPA. The Committee, in adopting this
provision, is concerned that this authority not be misused and
expects that the rules will ensure that such EPA personnel
will be well trained and will assess penalties on a reasonable
and consistent and fair basis." 3
Thus, EPA reasonably may conclude that it cannot delegate field citation
issuing authority to state or local officials.
Not surprisingly, several private businesses and federal agencies
object to EPA's plan to permit EPA employees to base field citations on
information from state and local inspections. These critics argue that EPA
should allow its employees to base field citations only on their own personal
observation and knowledge.2"4 They raise two points to support their argu-
ment. First, using state and local inspection information will undermine
Congress's intent that EPA not delegate the program to the states.28 5 Second,
EPA employees cannot properly assess the circumstances surrounding the
violations when they rely upon second-hand information from state and local
282 See id.
218 H.R. REP. No. 101-490, pt. 1, at 393-94 (1990), reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON
ENV'T AND PUB. WORKS, 103D CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1990, at 1809, 3417-18 (1993).
284 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 5; Duquesne Light Comments to the Field
Citation Program at 2 (July 1, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-
D, Comment No. 35) [hereinafter Duquesne Light Comments]; Steel Manufacturers
Association Comments to the Field Citation Program at 1-2 (July 6, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air
Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 4 1) [hereinafter Steel Comments];
Southern California Edison Company Comments to the Field Citation Program at 1-2 (July
8, 1994) (U.S. EPA Air Docket No. A-91-63, Category No. IV-D, Comment No. 60).
285 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 5; Steel Comments, supra note 284, at 1.
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inspectors; thus, EPA will not be able to ensure that the citations are accurate,
fair, and consistent.286
The Agency's plan to rely upon information from state and local
inspections raises other issues. For instance, if EPA employees rely upon
second-hand information from state and local inspections, they will not issue
the field citations in the field; they will issue them from their offices. This
certainly will enable EPA to issue many more field citations. However, if
EPA employees base citations on second-hand information, processing and
serving the citations will take longer. The EPA employees will not be at the
facilities to issue the citations immediately after discovering the violations.
Also, conscientious employees will spend time verifying the second-hand
information and/or considering the recipients' explanations. If EPA employ-
ees do not verify their second-hand information and consider the recipient's
explanations, they might issue citations when circumstances do not justify the
citations. This procedure may result in many more recipients challenging
their field citations than the Agency expects. The Agency should ask itself
if this will further its goals for the program to deter minor violations and
encourage violators promptly to correct their violations and pay their fines.
Section 113(d)(3) does not expressly prohibit EPA from using state
and local inspection information to issue field citations. Moreover, the
legislative history does not address this issue directly.287 However, section
113(d)(3) gives the Administrator the discretion to designate the "officers or
employees" who may issue field citations.2 8 This implies that Congress
authorized the Administrator to supervise the officers and employees issuing
field citations. This supervision easily may include determining the type of
evidence on which officers and employees will base their field citations.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable for EPA to conclude that it may permit its
286 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 5; Duquesne Light Comments, supra note 284,
at 2; Steel Comments, supra note 284, at 2.
287 The Senate Environment and Public Works Committee flirted with the issue when it
stated: "The Act also is amended to authorize the Administrator to issue 'field citations' for
minor violations discovered during the course of an inspection, and for violations of routine
reporting and recordkeeping requirements." S. REP. No. 101-228, at 365 (1990), reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3748.
288 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3) (1994); see also supra note 44.
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employees to base field citations on information from state and local
inspections. This interpretation will significantly impact federal facilities if
EPA applies the field citation program to them.
VI. APPLYING THE FIELD CITATION PROGRAM TO FEDERAL AGENCIES
A. The Department of Defense's Argument Against EPA 's Authority to Apply
the Field Citation Program to Federal Agencies.
Remarkably, though several federal agencies submitted comments to
the field citation program, only DOD challenged EPA's authority to assess
field citations against federal agencies. 89 In its initial comments to the
rulemaking and in a subsequent memorandum to the DOJ's Office of Legal
Counsel challenging EPA's authority to assess field citations against federal
facilities,2 90 DOD raised five arguments. First, EPA cannot apply the field
citation program to federal facilities because it lacks clear statutory authority
to do so. 9 Second, EPA should interpret its section 113 enforcement
authority over federal agencies in light of CAA section 118 (Control of
pollution from Federal facilities) and the Supreme Court's interpretation of
similar federal facilities provisions in United States Department of Energy v.
Ohio. 92 Third, if EPA applies the program against federal facilities, it will
29 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 7-10.
290 Section 1 13(d)(3) of the CAA provides that "[t]he Administrator may implement, after
consultation with the A9ttorney General and the States, a field citation program . 42
U.S.C. §7413(d)(3); see also infra note 473.
291 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 8; see also Memorandum from Judith A.
Miller, General Counsel, Department of Defense, to Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, DOD Response Memorandum: Assessment of Admini-
strative Penalties Against Executive Branch Agencies Under Section 113(d) of the Clean Air
Act 3-7 (Dec. 15, 1995) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy
Review) [hereinafter DOD Response].
292 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 9; see also DOD Response, supra note 291,
at 12-13. See generally Clean Air Act § 118, 42 U.S.C. § 7418 (1994); United States Dep't
of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992) (finding that Congress had not waived the federal
government's sovereign immunity from punitive fines under the Clean Water Act or
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act).
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interfere with the President's authority under Article II of the U.S.
Constitution to supervise executive branch agencies.29 3 Fourth, Congress
could not have intended EPA to apply the field citation program to federal
facilities because Article III of the U.S. Constitution precludes federal
agencies from seeking judicial review under CAA section 113(d)(4).294
Finally, if EPA has the authority to impose civil penalties on executive
agencies, the unitary executive doctrine requires EPA to afford other
executive agencies special procedural rules.295
1. EPA Lacks Clear Statutory Authority
DOD argues that EPA may not apply the field citation program to
federal agencies unless the CAA gives EPA "clear and express authority" to
do so.296 Permitting EPA to assess administrative penalties against executive
branch agencies will invite federal courts to intervene into "a purely
Executive Branch function, thus raising significant constitutional separation
of powers concerns, warranting the high standard of review., 297 To support
its argument, DOD cites a 1994 DOJ Office of Legal Counsel opinion on
whether the Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") could
initiate enforcement proceedings against the U.S. Department of Agriculture
("USDA") under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA"). 98
293 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 1-2; see also DOD Response, supra note 291,
at 7-10.
294 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 8; see also DOD Response, supra note 291,
at 10-11. Article III of the U.S. Constitution states in part, "[t]he judicial power shall extend
.. to controversies to which the United States shall be a party .... " U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2.
295 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 2.
296 See DOD Response, supra note 291, at 4.
297 Id. at 4.
298 Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to James S. Gilliland, General Counsel, Department of Agriculture, Authority of
Department of Housing and Urban Development to Initiate Enforcement Actions Under the
Fair Housing Act Against Executive Branch Agencies (May 17, 1994) [hereinafter Fair
Housing Act Memorandum], available in 1994 OLC LEXIS 11. See generally Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1994).
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Sections 810 through 812 of the FHA empower HUD to investigate
discrimination complaints, subpoena evidence, conduct hearings, issue
administrative orders, petition U.S. courts of appeal to enforce administrative
orders, and bring civil action in U.S. district courts against "any res-
pondent., 299 Also, FHA section 814 authorizes the Attorney General to bring
civil actions on behalf of "the [HUD] Secretary" or persons denied rights
under the FHA in U.S. district court.3"0 In its May 17, 1994 memorandum,
the Office of Legal Counsel noted that applying these enforcement measures
against executive branch agencies would raise "substantial separation of
powers concerns," unless the FHA contained an "express statement" of
Congress's intent to apply the enforcement measures to executive agencies.3"'
Involving the federal courts in disputes between executive branch agencies
would affect the President's Article II authority to supervise and resolve
disputes among his subordinates. 302 Additionally, "lawsuits between two
federal agencies are not generally justiciable" under Article III because they
are not cases or controversies between different parties.30 3 Together, these
concerns comprise the unitary executive doctrine.30 4 The Office of Legal
Counsel concluded that the FHA does not contain an express statement
applying its enforcement measures against federal agencies.30 5 The language
299 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3610-3612.
'00 See id. § 3614.
301 See Fair Housing Act Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994 OLC LEXIS
11, at * 1, 8-9 (citing Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) and Public Citizen
v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 446 (1989)).
302 See id. at * 11-12.
303 See id. at * 12 (citing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Imposition of Civil Penalties
on the Air Force, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 138 (1989) (preliminary print)).
304 See Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, House of
Representatives, 100th Cong. 182, 208-14 (1987) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, Assis-
tant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Department of Justice) [here-
inafter Habicht Statement]; see also Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Imposition of Civil
Penalties on the Air Force, 13 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 135-37 (1989) (preliminary print)
[hereinafter Barr Memorandum].




in sections 810 through 812 and 814 does not expressly apply the enforce-
ment measures to federal agencies, and the FHA's definitions of "person" and
"respondent" do not include federal agencies." 6 Consequently, HUD could
not apply the FHA's enforcement measures against USDA.3"7
DOD contends that section 113(d) does not provide the "clear and
express authority" necessary for EPA to impose administrative penalties
against other executive branch agencies. 38 Nowhere in section 113(d) does
3 Section 802(d) of the FHA states: "'Person' includes one or more individuals, corpo-
rations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in
cases under title 11, receivers, and fiduciaries." 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1994). Section 802(n)
defines "respondent" to mean "the person or other entity accused in a complaint of an unfair
housing practice" and "any other person or entity identified in the course of investigation and
notified as required with respect to respondents so identified under section 3610(a) ... 
Id. § 3602(n).
307 The Office of Legal Counsel stated,
[W]e are inclined to agree with USDA that, in light of the [FHA's] various
express references to the United States and the federal government, see,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(a), 3608(d), 3612(p), 3613(c)(2), 3614(d)(2),
Congress's "failure to include the United States in the definition of
respondent- . . . a term used repeatedly throughout the statutory
description of the enforcement mechanism-evinces an intent that Federal
agencies are not subject to the administrative procedure."
Fair Housing Act Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994 OLC LEXIS 11, at *14-
15 (quoting Letter from James Michael Kelly, Associate General Counsel, U.S. Department
of Agriculture, to Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel 3
(Jan. 6, 1994)). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 3603(a) (applying FHA prohibitions to dwellings
owned, operated or provided by the federal government); id. § 3608(d) (directing executive
agencies to cooperate with the furtherance of fair housing purposes); id. § 36 12 (p) (extending
liability to the federal government for the attorney's fees of a prevailing party, other than the
United States, in an administrative proceeding); id. § 3613(c)(2) (extending liability to the
federal government for the attorney's fees of a prevailing party, other than the United States,
in a citizen suit against the federal government); id. § 3614(d)(2) (extending liability to the
federal government for the attorney's fees of a prevailing party, other than the United States,
in a civil action brought by the Attorney General).
308 See DOD Response, supra note 291, at 3-7.
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Congress mention assessing civil penalties against federal agencies.3" Nor
does section 1 13(d)(3) specifically identify to whom EPA may issue field
citations. In the first sentence of section 11 3(d)(3), Congress authorizes the
Administrator to "implement, after consultation with the Attorney General
and the States, a field citation program .. ,,."o Section 1 13(d)(3) refers only
to "any person" when discussing the procedural rights of persons receiving
field citations.3"' Since section 113 does not define "person," DOD acknow-
ledges that we must look to the Act's general definition of "person," which
includes federal agencies.312 However, DOD argues that the references to
"any person" in sections 113(d)(3) and (4) cannot constitute an "express
statement" of Congress's intent to apply the field citation program to federal
agencies." 3 Since the unitary executive doctrine precludes executive
agencies from seeking judicial review of administrative orders, "the full
context of the program is not applicable to federal agencies."'31 4 This is
particularly significant in light of section 118 (Control of pollution from
Federalfacilities), which subjects federal facilities to all federal requirements
and "process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any nongovern-
mental entity."'3 15
" Section 1 13(d)(l) states, "The Administrator may issue an administrative order against
any person assessing a civil administrative penalty of up to $25,000, per day of violation.
.42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (1994).
310 Id. § 7413(d)(3); see DOD Response, supra note 291, at 4.
3" The second sentence of section 1 13(d)(3) states: "Any person to whom a field citation
is assessed may ... elect to pay the penalty assessment or to request a hearing on the field
citation." 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3). Additionally, section 113(d)(4) states that "[a]ny person"
receiving a field citation under subsection (3) may seek review in a U.S. district court. See
id. § 7413(d)(4).
312 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 8; DOD Response, supra note 291, at 4.
3' See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 8; DOD Response, supra note 291, at 4-5.
314 DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 8.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (emphasis added).
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2. Case Law Limits the Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
According to DOD, section 118 prescribes the limits of EPA's
enforcement authority over federal agencies, and it does not authorize EPA
to assess administrative penalties against federal agencies." 6 In United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio,317 the Supreme Court reviewed section 313
of the Clean Water Act ("CWA")318 and section 6001 of the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act,319 both of which contained language substan-
tially similar to that in CAA section 118.320 The Court determined that the
language did not subject federal facilities to administrative fines, but only to
coercive, court-imposed sanctions for contempt. 32' "Congress was using
'sanction' in its coercive sense, to the exclusion of punitive fine., 322 In Sierra
316 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 9; DOD Response, supra note 291, at 12.
317 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
318 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1988) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994)).
319 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994)).
320 The relevant portion of CWA section 313(a) states:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the discharge or runoff of pollutants, and each officer,
agent, or employee thereof in the performance of his official duties, shall
be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local
requirements, administrative authority, and process and sanctions
respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same
manner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity including
the payment of reasonable service charges. The preceding sentence shall
apply (A) to any requirement whether substantive or procedural (including
any recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting
permits and any other requirement, whatsoever), (B) to the exercise of any
Federal, State, or local administrative authority, and (C) to any process
and sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in any
other manner.
33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
3' See 503 U.S. at 623.
32' DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 9 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio,
503 U.S. 607, 623 (1992)); see DOD Response, supra note 291, at 12.
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Club v. Lujan,3 23 the Tenth Circuit, after concluding that the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio applied to enforce-
ment under both state and federal law, held that Congress had not waived
sovereign immunity from punitive civil penalties for past violations of the
CWA.3 24 DOD argues that, because CAA section 118 is substantially similar
to CWA section 313, the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States Depart-
ment of Energy v. Ohio also applies to CAA section 118.325 Therefore, DOD
concludes that section 11 8(a) does not authorize EPA to assess administrative
penalties against federal agencies, and EPA must narrowly interpret its
section 113(d) enforcement authorities accordingly.3 26
3. . The Program Will Interfere With the President's Ability to Supervise
Executive Branch Agencies
DOD believes that applying the field citation program to federal
facilities will interfere with the President's Article II ability to supervise
executive branch agencies.327 Any person who incurs a section 1 13(d)(3)
penalty may request an administrative hearing under section 1 13(d)(3), and
subsequently seek review of the penalty in a U.S. district court under section
113(d)(4).328 If a person fails to pay a penalty, "the Administrator shall
request the Attorney General to bring a civil action in an appropriate district
court" to recover the penalty. 329 In essence, Section 11 3(d) neither provides
an interagency dispute resolution process, nor grants the Attorney General
adequate discretion to resolve an interagency dispute.330
323 972 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1992).
324 See id. at 316.
325 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 9; DOD Response, supra note 291, at 13.
326 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 9.
327 See id. at 1-2.
32 See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3), (4) (1994).
329 1d. § 7413(d)(5)(B).
330 See DOD Response, supra note 291, at 8-9.
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4. The Program Does Not Account for Federal Agencies
In granting EPA authority to implement the field citation program,
Congress provided that "[a]ny person against whom a civil penalty is
assessed under [a field citation program] ... may seek review of such assess-
ment in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia or [in
another federal district court with jurisdiction] . . . .""I This ability to seek
judicial review, according to DOD, is a crucial element of EPA's authority
to impose administrative penalties under the field citation program.332
However, Article III of the U.S. Constitution bars independent judicial review
of EPA penalty assessments against federal agencies.333 DOD concludes that,
since an essential element of the program does not apply to federal agencies,
the entire program should not apply to federal agencies.334
5. The Unitary Executive Doctrine Requires EPA to Afford Federal Agencies
Special Procedural Rules
If EPA applies the field citation program to federal agencies, it must
supplement its field citation rule to afford federal agencies an opportunity to
consult with the Administrator before any penalty assessment becomes
final.335 The unitary executive doctrine and Article II of the U.S. Constitution
require EPA to afford a federal agency the opportunity to contest admini-
33 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4).
332 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 2; DOD Response, supra note 291, at 10- 1l.
... See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 2 (citing United States v. Shell Oil, 605 F.
Supp. 1064, 1081-84 (D. Colo. 1985) (barring Shell Oil from joining the U.S. Army as a
defendant because the Army, being a unit of the United States government, could not be sued
by the United States government, as such a suit would not be a "case or controversy" under
Article III of the U.S. Constitution because the United States would be suing itself). Article
III of the U.S. Constitution states in part, "The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law
and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and . . .to
controversies to which the United States shall be a party ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.
1.
311 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 2.
... See id.
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strative orders and penalties within the executive branch.336 Additionally, as
discussed above, Article III of the Constitution precludes federal agencies
from appealing EPA penalty assessments in a federal district court.3 37 These
constitutional problems will preclude federal agencies from enjoying the
same review procedures as nongovernmental entities under the field citation
program.338 Consequently, the field citation program will not treat federal
agencies ".in the same manner and to the same extent as any nongovern-
mental entity,' as mandated by section 118(a)., 3 9 To remedy this problem,
DOD suggests that EPA afford federal agencies the same procedures they
enjoy under RCRA.34" This will give federal agencies access to formal
administrative hearings, comparable to the judicial review available to non-
federal entities under the program.3 1' Also, after exhausting the part 22 pro-
cedures, a federal agency still may consult with the Administrator.342
B. The Department of Justice's Opinion
In October 1995 EPA asked the DOJ's Office of Legal Counsel to
settle the dispute between EPA and DOD concerning: (1) whether the Clean
Air Act authorizes EPA to administratively assess civil penalties against
federal agencies for CAA violations, and (2) whether EPA could exercise this
336 See id. at 1 (citing Habicht Statement, supra note 304, at 210).
... See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
331 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 2.
311 Id. (quoting Clean Air Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994)).
340 See id. "In contesting RCRA penalty assessments, EPA affords federal agencies full
40 C.F.R. Part 22 procedures." Id. (citing Final Enforcement Guidance on Implementation
of the Federal Facility Compliance Act, U.S. EPA (July 6, 1993)); see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 22
(1996). RCRA § 6001(b)(2) states: "No administrative order issued to such a department,
agency, or instrumentality shall become final until such department, agency, or
instrumentality has had the opportunity to confer with the Administrator." 42 U.S.C.
§ 696 1(b)(2) (1994).
311 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 3.
342 See id. at 2.
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authority consistent with the Constitution.343 The Office of Legal Counsel
concluded that, even though it would raise "separation of powers concerns,"
the Act clearly authorized EPA to administratively assess section 113(d)
penalties against federal agencies, and that EPA could exercise this authority
consistent with the Constitution."
1. The Clean Air Act authorizes EPA administratively to assess civil
penalties against federal agencies for CAA violations
The Office of Legal Counsel agreed with DOD that EPA may not
assess section 113(d) penalties against federal agencies without a "clear
statement" of Congress's intent to apply section 113(d) enforcement
measures to federal agencies.345  Applying section 113(d) enforcement
measures to federal agencies also will raise substantial separation of powers
concerns. 346 First, the proceedings could affect the President's Article II
authority to supervise executive branch agencies and resolve disputes
between them.347 Second, federal agencies cannot seek section 113(d)(4)
judicial review, nor will the Attorney General seek section 1 13(d)(5) judicial
enforcement against federal agencies, because "lawsuits between two federal
agencies are not generally justiciable. '3 4' Both the Supreme Court and the
"' See Memorandum from Dawn E. Johnson, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office
of Legal Counsel, to Jonathan Z. Cannon, General Counsel, Environmental Protection
Agency, and Judith A. Miller, General Counsel, Department of Defense, Administrative
Assessment of Civil Penalties Against Federal Agencies Under the Clean Air Act 1 (July 16,
1997) (on file with the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review) [here-
inafter Cannon and Miller Memorandum]. Under Executive Order 12,146, the President has
designated the Attorney General to resolve legal disputes between executive branch agencies.
See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1980), reprinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509
(1994); see also infra note 473.
3" See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 1, 3.
141 See id. at 3, 5.
346 See id.
141 See id. at 4 (citing Fair Housing Act Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994
OLC LEXIS 11, at *13).
348 Id. at 4 (citing Fair Housing Act Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994 OLC
LEXIS 11, at * 12); see also Barr Memorandum, supra note 304, at 138.
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DOJ have consistently held that, due to "the dangerous constitutional
thickets" '349 involved, the government may not apply an act of Congress in any
manner that raises substantial separation of powers or federalism concerns
without a "clear statement of congressional intent" to do so.35°
In its legal opinion, the Office of Legal Counsel argued that CAA
sections 113(d) and 302(e), together with the Act's legislative history, clearly
express Congress's intent to apply section 113(d) enforcement measures to
federal agencies. 35' In 1977, Congress expanded the definition of "person"
in the Clean Air Act "to include 'any agency, department, or instrumentality
of the United States ... 352 The House committee reporting on this
amendment stated, "the committee is expressing its unambiguous intent that
the enforcement authorities of section 113 may be used to insure compliance
and/or to impose sanctions against any Federal violator of the act." '353
Consequently, in including federal agencies within the Act's general defi-
nition of "person," the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that Congress
clearly intended to subject federal agencies to section 113(d) enforcement
measures.
354
... See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 4 (quoting Fair Housing Act
Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994 OLC LEXIS 11, at * 14); see also Gregory
v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461 (1991); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 446 (1989); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989); United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971).
"0 See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 4 (citing Memorandum from
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Jack Quinn,
Counsel to the President, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of
Federal Judges (Dec. 18, 1995)).
35 See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 5-6; see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7413(d), 7602(e) (1994).
352 Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 5 (quoting the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 301(b), 91 Stat. 685, 770); see also Clean Air
Act § 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1994).
311 Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 7 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-294,




2. EPA Can Exercise this Authority Consistent With the Constitution
Since the Clean Air Act does not preclude the President from
determining how to resolve disputes between EPA and other federal agencies,
the Office of Legal Counsel concluded that the CAA does not conflict with
the President's Article II authority to supervise executive branch agencies.355
Any federal agencies incurring a section 113(d)(3) penalty may request an
administrative hearing and consult with the EPA Administrator before the
assessment is final. 56 Furthermore, the Act does not prevent the Attorney
General from resolving any disputes before they reach the courts. 357 Section
113(d)(5) merely limits the authority of the courts; it does not restrict the
Attorney General's Executive Order 12,146 or litigation review authority.358
Additionally, the Office of Legal Counsel noted that the Act does not
conflict with Article III because it does not require federal agencies to dispute
penalty assessments in court.359 Under section 113(d)(5), the Attorney
General determines whether to bring any enforcement action on behalf of
EPA in federal court.360 She will not permit EPA to sue another federal
agency because "lawsuits between two federal agencies are not generally
justiciable.""36 In short, since the Act permits the President and the Attorney
General to resolve interagency conflicts and forestall litigation between
federal agencies; it does not conflict with the Constitution.362
C. Analysis
DOD raises three strong arguments against EPA's proposal. 363 First,
the language of section 113(d) does not expressly state that EPA may assess
... See id. at 7-8.
356 See id. at 8.
... See id.
... See id.
9 See id. at 9.
" See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5) (1994).
363 See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 9-10.
362 See id.
363 See supra Part VI.A.
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administrative penalties against federal agencies.3" Second, the Supreme
Court's holding in United States Department ofEnergy v. Ohio,365 indicates
that section 11 8(a) does not authorize EPA to assess civil penalties against
federal agencies. 366 Third, since the unitary executive doctrine effectively
precludes federal agencies from challenging section 113(d) penalties in court,
the program will not apply to federal agencies "in the same manner, and to
the same extent as any nongovernmental entity." '367 However, the Office of
Legal Counsel correctly concluded that EPA may apply section 113(d)
enforcement measures to federal agencies.368 In passing the 1977 amend-
ments to the CAA, Congress intended to subject federal agencies to section
113(d) enforcement measures. 369 Furthermore, by affording federal agencies
opportunities to consult with the Administrator and seek review within the
executive branch, EPA can exercise its section 113(d) enforcement authority
consistent with the unitary executive doctrine.370
1. Congress Intended to Apply Section 113(d) Enforcement to Federal
Agencies
I will begin my analysis with the case that prompted Congress to
include federal agencies within the CAA's definition of "person."
a. Hancock v. Train371
In Hancock v. Train, the Attorney General of Kentucky sought
declaratory and injunctive relief to require federal facilities within the State
to obtain state permits under the State's air pollution control program.372 In
... See supra Part VI.A. 1.
365 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
366 See supra Part VI.A.2.
3,7 42 U.S.C. 7418(a) (1994); see supra Part VI.A.5.
368 See supra Part VI.B.
369 See Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 6-7.
370 See id. at 7-8.
17' 426 U.S. 169 (1976).
372 See id. at 176.
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May, 1972, EPA approved the State's implementation plan.3 73 Chapter 7 of
the SIP included the State's Air Pollution Control Commission Regulations,
which prohibited any person from operating an air contaminant source within
the State without a permit.3 74  When the State sought to include federal
facilities within the program, EPA directed the federal facilities within the
State to provide the State with all of the information it needed to determine
whether the facilities were complying with the state standards and discharge
limitations.3 75 However, EPA concluded that the CAA did not require federal
facilities to apply for state operating permits.376
In response to EPA's directive, the State of Kentucky filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky to compel
EPA to use CAA section 113 to force the federal facilities within the State to
comply with the State's permit requirements.3 77 On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgement, the district court dismissed the complaint and the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit subsequently affirmed.3 78 The Sixth Circuit
concluded that CAA section 118 379 did not subject federal agencies to state
permit requirements.8 On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the State
argued that, under CAA section 118, federal facilities within Kentucky had
to meet state requirements and that "whatever is required by a state
See id. at 172.
174 See id. at 172-73.
... See id. at 175.
376 See id.
377 See Kentucky ex rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Ky. 1973).
378 See id., aff'd, 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974).
171 Under the 1970 amendments to the CAA, the pertinent portion of section 118 (Control
of pollution from Federal facilities) stated:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, shall comply with
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements respecting control and
abatement of air pollution to the same extent that any person is subject to
such requirements.
Pub. L. 91-604, § 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1954, 1971.
380 See 497 F.2d at 1177.
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implementation plan is a 'requirement' under [section] 11 8."38' The Supreme
Court first noted that:
Taken with the "old and well-known rule that statutes which
in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will
not be applied to the sovereign" "without a clear expression
or implication to that effect," this immunity means that where
"Congress does not affirmatively declare its instrumentalities
or property subject to regulation," "the federal function must
be left free" of regulation.38 2
The Court further stated that only a clear and unambiguous
Congressional action could subject federal agencies to state regulations.383
It observed that the State, by claiming the authority to issue permits to federal
facilities, is claiming the power to prohibit operations at federal facilities.384
The Court stated that nothing in section 118, its relation to the CAA as a
whole, or in its legislative history expressed "any clear and unambiguous
declaration by the Congress that federal installations may not perform their
activities unless a state official issues a permit." '385 The Court examined
section 118 and pointed out that it did not provide that federal facilities "shall
comply with all federal, state, interstate, and local requirements" nor that
federal facilities "shall comply with all requirements of the applicable state
implementation plan." '386 Next, the Court examined the legislative history of
section 118 and concluded that Congress only intended to require federal
agencies to comply with emission limitations and standards, not to empower
states to force federal facilities to comply with all aspects of their SIPs.387
3' 426 U.S. at 183.
382 Id. at 179 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 272 (1947), United States v. Wittek, 337 U.S. 346, 359 (1949), and Mayo v. United
States, 319 U.S. 441, 447-48 (1943)).
383 See id.
384 See id. at 180.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 182.
3187 See id. at 187-90.
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The Court concluded that section 118 did not subject federal facilities to state
permit requirements.388
b. Amendments of 1977
Congress responded to Hancock in the 1977 amendments to the Clean
Air Act by amending section 118 to require federal agencies to comply with
"all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, . . . (including any
recordkeeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits
and any other requirement whatsoever) ... ."389 Congress also amended sec-
tion 302(e) to include within the Act's definition of "person," "any agency,
department, or instrumentality of the United States and any officer, agent, or
employee thereof. ' 390 The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, which proposed the change to sections 118 and 302(e) in House Bill
616 1,391 stated that the amendment was "intended to overturn the Hancock
case and to express, with sufficient clarity, the committee's desire to subject
Federal facilities to all Federal, State, and local requirements-procedural,
substantive, or otherwise-process, and sanctions. 392 In addition, the House
Committee stated:
The amendment is also intended to resolve any question about
the sanctions to which noncomplying Federal agencies,
facilities, officers, employees, or agents may be subject. The
applicable sanctions are to be the same for Federal facilities
and personnel as for privately owned pollution sources and
for the owners or operators thereof. This means that Federal
facilities and agencies may be subject to injunctive relief (and
criminal or civil contempt citations to enforce any such
388 See id. at 198-99.
311 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116(a), 91 Stat. 685, 711
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994)) (emphasis added).
190 Id. § 301(b), 91 Stat. at 770 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1994)).
'9' H.R. 6161, 95th Cong. (1977).
192 H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 199 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1278.
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injunction), to civil or criminal penalties, and to delayed
compliance penalties . . . . Finally, in defining the term
"person" for the purpose of section 113 of the act to include
Federal agencies, departments, instrumentalities, officers,
agents, or employees, the committee is expressing its
unambiguous intent that the enforcement authorities of
section 113 may be used to insure compliance and/or impose
sanctions against any Federal violator of the act.393
Congress eventually adopted House Bill 6161; however, the Con-
ference Committee did not adopt the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce's broad interpretation of the amendment. Instead, the
Conference Committee described the amendment as requiring federal facili-
ties to comply with
all substantive and procedural air pollution requirements of
Federal, State, interstate, or local law to the same extent as
any person subject to such requirements ... [and] that all
Federal facilities must comply with all substantive and
procedural requirements of applicable State implementation
plans. Certain procedural requirements with which Federal
facilities must comply are specified: construction and
393 Id. at 200, reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1279. The Senate did not attempt
such a broad waiver in its amendment proposal (Senate Bill 252). See S. 252, 95th Cong.
(1977). According to the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, the
Senate bill would have amended section 118 to
specify that, as in the case of water pollution, a Federal facility is subject
to any Federal, State, and local requirement respecting the control or
abatement of air pollution, both substantive and procedural, to the same
extent as any person is subject to these requirements[,] ... [including] any
provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions imposed by a court to
enforce such relief, and the payment of reasonable service charges.
S. REP. No. 95-127, at 58 (1977).
Additionally, the Senate did not attempt to change the act's definition of "person"
to include federal agencies. See S. 252.
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operating permits, reporting and monitoring; injunctive relief
and sanction provisions and the payment of reasonable service
charges.... The conferees intend ... to authorize States to
sue Federal facilities in State courts, and to subject facilities
to State sanctions.394
Congress also adopted the House's amendment to section 302(e), thereby
including federal agencies within the CAA's definition of "person."'3 95
However, the conference report did not discuss the change.
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended that CAA
section 118 require federal facilities to comply with all federal, interstate,
state, and local air pollution control requirements.396 Congress even
specifically listed several examples of the substantive and procedural
requirements in both the statute and the legislative history.397 Unfortunately,
Congress did not specifically state which penalties and sanctions applied to
federal facilities. The only available history addressing the amendment to
section 302(e) indicates that Congress, by including federal facilities within
the CAA's definition of "person," intended to subject federal facilities to the
section 113 enforcement authorities and sanctions.3 98
c. United States Department of Energy v. Ohio399
Between 1951 and 1990 the United States Department of Energy
194 H.R. REP. No. 95-564, at 137 (1977).
... See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 301(b), 91 Stat. 685, 770
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7602(e) (1994)).
396 See supra notes 389-95 and accompanying text.
... See supra notes 389, 393-94.
398 See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 200 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1279.
'99 503 U.S. 607 (1992).
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("DOE") operated a uranium processing facility at Femald, Ohio.4°° In 1986
the State of Ohio sued DOE in federal district court for violating state and
federal pollution laws,"° including the Clean Water Act ("CWA")402 and the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"). 4°3 Along with
equitable relief and damages, Ohio sought both state and federal civil
penalties against DOE for past violations of the CWA, RCRA, and
supplementing state laws.40 4
The district court held that both the CWA and RCRA waived the
federal government's sovereign immunity to civil penalties in both acts'
citizen suit and federal facility sections.4 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed in part; it held that Congress had waived sovereign
immunity for civil penalties in the CWA's federal facilities section and in
RCRA's citizen suit section, but not in RCRA's federal facilities section.40 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "whether Congress ha[d]
waived the National government's sovereign immunity from liability for civil
4 A private contractor, on behalf of DOE, operated the Feed Materials Production Center
("FMPC") at Femald, Ohio. The FMPC processed uranium for the nation's nuclear weapons
program. The facility sat over Ohio's Great Miami aquifer, a sole source aquifer for
southwestern Ohio. During its thirty-six years of operation, the FMPC disposed of
approximately 892,000 cubic yards of waste, including 12.7 million pounds of uranium and
176,000 pounds of thorium, in waste pits at the facility. It also had released approximately
340,000 pounds of radioactive dust into the air. Eventually the waste in the pits began to leak
into the aquifer. DOE permanently shut down the facility on October 1, 1990. Ohio alleged
that DOE had improperly disposed of hazardous wastes into the air, water, and soil in
violation of RCRA and the CWA. See Daniel Home, Federal Facility Environmental
Compliance After United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 631,
641-43 (1994).
40 See Ohio v. Department of Energy, 689 F. Supp. 760, 761 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
402 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
403 In this case, RCRA refers to the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA"),42 U.S.C. §§
6901-6992k (1994), as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
404 See 503 U.S. at 612.
40 See 689 F. Supp. at 767. The CWA's citizen suit provision is at section 505. See 33
U.S.C. § 1365 (1994). RCRA's citizen suit provision is at section 7002. See 42 U.S.C. §
6972 (1994). The CWA's federal facilities provision is at section 313. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323
(1994). RCRA's federal facilities provision is at section 6001. See 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1994).
41 See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058, 1062, 1065. (6th Cir. 1990).
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fines imposed for past failure to comply with the CWA, RCRA, or state law
supplementing the federal regulation., 417 The Court, after analyzing the
citizen suit and federal facilities sections of the two statutes, determined that
Congress had not waived sovereign immunity from punitive fines4 8 in either
statute.40 9
The Court began its analysis by stating "that any waiver of the
National Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocal, 4 " and
that "[w]aivers of immunity must be construed strictly in favor of the
sovereign, and not enlarge[d] . .. beyond what the language requires."4t
Pursuant to this principle, the Court first examined the citizen suit sections,
then the CWA's federal facilities section, and then finally, RCRA's federal
facilities section.
The Court examined the two statutes' citizen suit sections together
because the sections were substantially similar.41 2 Under both citizen suit
407 503 U.S. at 612-13.
408 The Court referred to the disputed fines in this case as "punitive." See id. at 613-14.
409 See id. at 619-20, 623, 626, 628-29.
410 Id. at 615 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538-39 (1980)).
411 Id. (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685-86 (1983)); see also
McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951); Eastern Transp. Co. v. United States,
272 U.S. 675, 686 (1927).
412 See 503 U.S. at 615-16. The Court quoted portions of each statute's citizen suits
section that it determined to be pertinent. From CWA section 505(a) it quoted:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1) against any person (including... the United States... ) who
is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the
Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation ....
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce an
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order ... as the case
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [33
U.S.C. § 1319(d)].
Id.; see also Clean Water Act § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994). From RCRA section
7002(a), the Court quoted:
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sections, a state could sue as a citizen.4"3 Also, both sections subjected the
United States to citizen suits, and both sections incorporated each statute's
civil penalties sections. 4 The Court refused to accept Ohio's argument that,
by incorporating the statutes' civil penalties sections, the citizen suit sections
subjected federal agencies to civil penalties.415 The majority read the in-
corporation as "encompassing all the terms of the penalty provisions, includ-
ing their limitations."4 6 The Court noted that each statute applied civil pen-
alties only to "persons," and that "neither statute define[d] 'person' to include
the United States."'41 7 Thus, the Court concluded that the two statutes' civil
penalties sections did not apply to the United States." 8 Consequently, neither
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf-
(1)(A) against any person (including ... the United States) ...
who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard,
regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which
has become effective pursuant to this chapter; or
(B) against any person, including the United States... who has
contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment ....
The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to enforce the
permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition,
or order, referred to in paragraph (1)(A), to restrain any person
who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present
handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order
such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or
both,. . . and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under [42
U.S.C. §§ 6928(a) and (g)].
Id. at 616; see also RCRA § 7002(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1994).
413 See 503 U.S. at 613 n.5, 616.
44 See id. at 615-16.
415 See id. at 616-17, 620.
416 Id. at 617.
417 id.
411 See id. at 619.
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statutes' citizen suit sections waived the United States' immunity to civil
penalties.419
Next the Court examined the CWA's federal facilities section.420 The
State of Ohio argued that the section's use of the word "sanction" waived the
United States' immunity to fines.421 The Court found that the term "sanction"
could imply either punitive fines or coercive fines.422 Punitive fines en-
courage persons to obey the law by punishing substantive violations; on the
419 See id. at 619-20.
42 Section 313 of the CWA has not changed since the Court examined it in United States
Department of Energy v. Ohio. See 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (1994). It is similar to CAA section
118 (Control of pollution from Federalfacilities), which states:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the discharge of air pollutants, and each officer,
agent, or employee thereof, shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority,
and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of air
pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any non-
governmental entity. The preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any
requirement whether substantive or procedural (including any record-
keeping or reporting requirement, any requirement respecting permits and
any other requirement whatsoever), (B) to any requirement to pay a fee or
charge imposed by any State or local agency to defray the costs of its air
pollution regulatory program, (C) to the exercise of any Federal, State, or
local administrative authority, and (D) to any process and sanction,
whether enforced in Federal, State or local courts, or in any other manner.
This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any immunity of such
agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any law or rule of law. No
officer, agent, or employee of the United States shall be personally liable
for any civil penalty for which he is not otherwise liable.
Clean Air Act § 118(a); 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994). Representative Peter DeFazio
(Democrat-Oregon) recently introduced legislation to amend section 313 of the CWA to
waive sovereign immunity for civil and administrative fines and penalties. The legislation
also would amend section 502(5) of the CWA to include federal facilities within the statute's
definition of "person." See H.R. 2222, 106th Cong. § 5 (1997).
421 See 503 U.S. at 620.
422 See id. at 621.
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
other hand, courts use coercive fines to compel parties to obey court orders.423
Whenever the section employed the term "sanction," the section included it
within the phrase "process and sanctions.,,12' Thus, the Court reasoned that
the section only referred to "sanction" in the context of enforcing "pro-
cess."4 25 The Court concluded that the section only waived immunity to
coercive fines, not punitive fines.426
Next, the Court examined modifying language in the federal facilities
section, which stated that "the United States shall be liable only for those
civil penalties arising under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court
to enforce an order or the process of such court. 4 27 The Court conceded that
this language could suggest that the civil penalties arising under federal law
may include punitive fines. 28 However, it noted that, "[a]s far as federal law
is concerned, the only available source of authority to impose punitive fines
is the civil-penalties section, . . [but] ... that section does not authorize
liability against the United States, since it applies only against 'persons,' from
whom the United States is excluded. 4 29  Conversely, had the statute's
definition of "person" included federal agencies, federal agencies would be
subject to punitive fines.
Finally, the Court examined RCRA's federal facilities section. It
rejected Ohio's argument that the section, by subjecting federal agencies to
"all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements," explicitly waived
federal sovereign immunity from punitive fines.43 ° The Court, referring to its
earlier rationale distinguishing between punitive and coercive penalties,
determined that the section subjected federal agencies only to the substantive
423 See id. at 621-22.
424 See id. at 622.
425 See id. at 623.
426 See id.
427 Id. at 637 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988)). CAA section 113(a) does not contain
this language. See 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a) (1994). However, the Court's analysis demonstrates
that the civil penalties section can provide a separate waiver of sovereign immunity if the
statute's general definition of "person" includes federal facilities. See 503 U.S. at 624.
428 See 503 U.S. at 624.
429 id.
430 See id. at 627-28.
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standards and coercive sanctions under RCRA.43'
d. The Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992
Soon following, but not directly in response to the Court's opinion in
United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, Congress passed the Federal
Facility Compliance Act of 1992 ("FFCA").432 The FFCA amended RCRA
section 6001 to expressly waive the United States' immunity to "all civil and
administrative penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or
fines are punitive or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated,
intermittent, or continuing violations., 433 Additionally, the FFCA included
federal agencies in RCRA's general definition of "person. 434
In June, 1991, while considering the FFCA legislation, the House
Energy and Commerce Committee commented that, "the failure to explicitly
mention federal agencies in the original definition of 'person' in RCRA has
led some courts to the erroneous conclusion that federal agencies are not
covered by the same sanctions and enforcement mechanisms as other
persons. '  The Committee stated that, by including federal agencies within
RCRA's definition of "person," "RCRA will now parallel the Clean Air
Act... which treat[s] federal agencies as 'persons."'436 While addressing the
source of payments for civil penalties, the Committee noted that "[t]he United
States is subject to civil penalties for violations of state or local air pollution
regulations pursuant to Section 118 of the Clean Air Act., 437 Congress did
"' See id. at 628.
432 Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (amending the Solid Waste Disposal Act).
411 Id. § 102(a)(3), 106 Stat. at 1505 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994)). Congress
also inserted the following language into RCRA section 6001 (a): "No agent, employee, or
officer of the United States shall be personally liable for any civil penalty under any Federal,
State, interstate, or local solid or hazardous waste law with respect to any act or omission
within the scope of the official duties of the agent, employee, or officer." Id. § 102(a)(4),
106 Stat. at 1505 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1994)).
414 See id. § 103, 106 Stat. at 1507 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1994)).
4' H.R. REP. No. 102-111, at 18 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1304.
436 Id.
... Id. at 15, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1287, 1301.
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not similarly amend the federal facilities sections in either the CWA or the
CAA, 3 nor did it amend the CWA to include federal agencies within its
general definition for "person." '439
This history suggests that Congress specifically intended to subject
federal agencies to section 113(d) enforcement measures when it included
federal agencies within the Act's definition of "person" in the 1977 amend-
ments. When the Supreme Court reviewed the federal facilities sections of
the CWA and RCRA in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, neither
statute included federal agencies within their definitions of "persons." Thus,
the Court's decision in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio should
not prevent EPA from assessing section 113(d) penalties against federal
agencies.
2. The Constitution Does Not Preclude EPA from Assessing Section 113(d)
Penalties against Federal Agencies
The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel correctly concluded that EPA can
assess section 113(d) penalties consistently with Articles II and III of the
Constitution. EPA may avoid these constitutional concerns by affording
federal facilities opportunities to consult with the Administrator and to
resolve any disputes within the executive branch.4
a. Article 11, Cases and Controversies
According to the Office of Legal Counsel, "lawsuits between two
... Congress last amended CAA section 118(a) in 1990 when it subjected federal agencies
to "any requirement to pay a fee or charge imposed by any State or local agency to defray the
costs of its air pollution regulatory program." Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
No. 101-549, § 101(e), 104 Stat. 2409, 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994)).
411 CWA section 502(5) defines "person" as follows: "The term 'person' means an in-
dividual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5) (1994).
440 See supra VI.B.2.
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federal agencies are not generally justiciable."' Although this is likely true
for any possible disputes over section 1 13(d) penalties, the Supreme Court
has not ruled that disputes between federal agencies are per se non-
justiciable. Two significant cases help delineate the Court's position.
In United States v. Interstate Commerce Commission,"2 the United
States, as a shipper of goods, filed a complaint with the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC") against several railroads claiming that they had imposed
unreasonable rates upon the United States in violation of the Interstate
Commerce Act.443 The ICC ruled against the United States.4 When the
United States sued the ICC to set aside the Commission's order, the district
court dismissed the complaint on the theory that the United States could not
sue itself.445 The Supreme Court reversed." 6  The Court held that the
controversy was the type that was "traditionally justiciable," because the
"basic question [was] whether [the] railroads [had] illegally exacted sums of
money from the United States." 7 The United States, as a shipper of goods,
and the railroads were the "real parties in interest."448
In United States v. Nixon,449 President Richard Nixon had appointed
an independent special prosecutor to investigate the Watergate scandal, but
when the prosecutor subpoenaed the President's tapes and records, President
Nixon resisted.4 5 He argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction to interfere in
"' Cannon and Miller Memorandum, supra note 343, at 4, 9 (quoting the Fair Housing Act
Memorandum, supra note 298, available in 1994 OLC LEXIS 11, at * 12); see also Barr
Memorandum, supra note 304, at 138. But see Michael Herz, United States v. United States:
When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893, 910-14
(1991); Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q.
317, 331-41 (1990).
42 United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 337 U.S. 426 (1949).
441 See id. at 428-29.
"4 See id. at 429.
"' See id.
446 See id. at 430.
447 Id.
48 See id. at 431-32.
449 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
410 See id. at 683.
1997]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
an intra-branch dispute.45 ' The Supreme Court, rejecting President Nixon's
argument, stated that "[t]he mere assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch
dispute,' without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction;
justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry."4" The Court found
that the disclosure issues were "traditionally justiciable.",411 It also deter-
mined that the special prosecutor's asserted need for the tapes and the
President's interest in protecting the confidentiality of his communications
assured "concrete adverseness. 454 Finally, the Court concluded that "[i]n
light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that
both parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a
barrier to justiciability. '411
Together, Interstate Commerce Commission and Nixon create a two-
pronged analysis: First, is the dispute the type that is traditionally jus-
ticiable? Second, does the setting of the dispute assure concrete adversity
between parties? 456 Where the dispute is between two federal agencies, the
court should ask: Who are the real parties in interest? If one of the agencies
is simply standing in for private interests, the controversy most likely will be
justiciable.457 However, where both agencies are disputing their obligations
to execute the laws, such as environmental compliance disputes between EPA
and federal facilities, the disputes are non-justiciable and best resolved within
'5' See id. at 692-93.
452 Id. at 693.
453 See id. at 697.
414 See id.
455 Id.
456 See United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1082 (D. Colo. 1985); see also
Steinberg, supra note 441, at 337.
411 See Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 464
U.S. 89 (1983) (rejecting a FLRA ruling that required ATF to pay a union representative's
travel expenses); Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967) (ruling in favor of
the Secretary of the Interior and barring the Federal Power Commission from awarding a
license for a hydroelectric power project); Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645
(1954) (permitting the Secretary of Agriculture to intervene on behalf of agriculture interests




The Office of Legal Counsel can claim confidently that these inter-
agency disputes will not appear before any federal courts.4 59 CAA section
113 (d)(4) permits, but does not require, a person receiving either a section
1 13(d)(1) or (3) penalty to seek review in a federal district court 6.4  A federal
agency cannot seek judicial review of a section I 13(d) penalty without first
obtaining DOJ's approval and assistance.4 6' Furthermore, under section
1 13(d)(5), the Administrator must request the Attorney General to bring civil
actions in federal district courts to collect civil penalties under the program.462
Thus, the Attorney General can ensure that no federal agency files suit in a
458 See Ability of the Environmental Protection Agency to Sue Another Government
Agency, 9 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 99, 100 (1985).
411 See Barr Memorandum, supra note 304, at 141.
4 CAA § 113(d)(4) states in part: "Any person against whom a civil penalty is assessed
under paragraph (3) of this subsection or to whom an administrative penalty order is issued
under paragraph (1) of this subsection may seek review of such assessment in [a] United
States District Court .. " 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(4) (1994) (emphasis added).
461 Section 516 of Title 28 provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or
is interested, and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General." 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1994). Section 519
of Title 28 provides:
Except as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall
supervise all litigation to which the United States, an agency, or officer
thereof is a party, and shall direct all United States attorneys, assistant
United States attorneys, and special attorneys appointed under section 543
of this title in the discharge of their respective duties.
Id. § 519.
462 CAA section 1 13(d)(5) states in part:
If any person fails to pay an assessment of a civil penalty or fails to
comply with an administrative penalty order-
(A) after the order or assessment has become final, or
(B) after a court in an action brought under paragraph (4) has
entered a final judgement in favor of the Administrator,
the Administrator shall request the Attorney General to bring a civil action in an
appropriate district court to enforce the order or to recover the amount ordered or
assessed ....
42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(5).
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federal district court against another federal agency under section 113(d),
thereby avoiding any Article III justiciability issue.
b. Article II, Unitary Executive
The unitary executive doctrine does not preclude EPA from imposing
administrative penalties upon federal agencies; it merely affords the President
the opportunity to settle intra-branch disputes.463 In 1987 F. Henry Habicht
II, Assistant Attorney General for Land and Natural Resources Division of
the DOJ, testified before a House of Representatives subcommittee con-
cerning federal facility compliance with environmental laws.4"4 In his
prepared statement, Mr. Habicht explained that the unitary executive doctrine
stems from the President's constitutional duty to supervise the affairs of the
executive branch and to "take care that the Laws [are] faithfully executed."465
Accordingly, this duty gives the President "authority to exert 'general
administrative control over those executing the law."'466 The basic principle
under this doctrine is that the Constitution vests the executive power in a
single person, the President, who alone is accountable to the American people
for the actions of all executive agencies.467 Thus, the President, to ensure that
the executive branch speaks with a single voice, is responsible for settling
controversies within the executive branch either by himself or by establishing
procedures to settle controversies within the branch. 6 The President is
ultimately responsible "to ensure that executive agencies comply with
environmental laws." '469 However, under the unitary executive doctrine no
agency may sue another executive agency, nor order another agency to
463 See infra text accompanying notes 471-75.
464 Habicht Statement, supra note 304, at 206-14.
465 Id. at 207 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
6 1d. (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161-64 (1926) (stating that the Presi-
dent can remove an executive officer without the Senate's advice and consent and that Article
II empowers the President to supervise and guide Executive Branch officers in order to
secure a unitary and uniform execution of the laws)).
461 See id. at 208, 210.
468 See id. at 209.
469 Id. at 210.
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comply with an administrative order, "without the prior opportunity to contest
the order within the Executive Branch. 470
The President already has established procedures to settle environ-
mental compliance controversies within the executive branch. Under Execu-
tive Order 12,088, the Administrator of EPA must first attempt to resolve
conflicts over pollution control standards.471 If the Administrator cannot
resolve the conflict, the agencies may submit the dispute to the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget to resolve. 72 If there is a dispute over
jurisdiction or other legal issues, the Attorney General resolves the contro-
versy.473
Section 113(d) does not frustrate these mechanisms that the President
470 Id.
471 See Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321 (1994).
472 Executive Order 12,088 provides in part:
1-602. The Administrator [of EPA] shall make every effort to resolve
conflicts regarding such violation between Executive agencies and, on
request of any party, such conflicts between an Executive agency and a
State, interstate, or a local agency. If the Administrator cannot resolve a
conflict, the Administrator shall request the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget to resolve the conflict.
Id. "Such violation" refers to pollution control standards. See id.
17' Executive Order 12,146 provides in part:
1-401 Whenever two or more Executive agencies are unable to resolve a
legal dispute between them, including the question of which has
jurisdiction to administer a particular program or to regulate a particular
activity, each agency is encouraged to submit the dispute to the Attorney
General.
1-402. Whenever two or more Executive agencies whose heads serve at
the pleasure of the President are unable to resolve such a legal dispute, the
agencies shall submit the dispute to the Attorney General prior to
proceeding to any court, except where there is specific statutory vesting of
responsibility for a resolution elsewhere.
Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409 (1980), reprinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509
(1994). On July 16, 1997, pursuant to Executive Order 12,146, the DOJ's Office of Legal
Counsel resolved the dispute between DOD and EPA over whether EPA may apply section
113(d) enforcement measures against federal agencies. See Cannon and Miller Memo-
randum, supra note 343.
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has created to resolve interagency disputes. As discussed above, section
113(d) does not require the courts to resolve any disputes between EPA and
other federal agencies.474 Additionally, the Attorney General can ensure that
no federal agency files suit in a federal district court against another federal
agency over a section 113(d) penalty.475 In summary, EPA may assess section
113(d) penalties against other federal agencies as long as it abides by the
President's dispute resolution mechanisms-namely, by providing an
opportunity to consult with the Administrator and raise disputes to either the
Office of Management and Budget or the Attorney General.
6. Hearing Procedures for Federal Agencies
EPA's current proposal does not provide an opportunity for federal
agencies to either consult with the Administrator or seek review of disputes
outside EPA. Under the part 59 procedures that EPA is proposing for the
field citation program, any person, including a federal facility, receiving a
citation, can request an informal administrative hearing before a hearing
officer.476 The hearing officer likely will be a regional office employee who
otherwise is not involved in the case.477 After the hearing, the hearing officer
will recommend action to the regional administrator who will make the final
agency decision. 478 The Environmental Appeals Board ("EAB") may sua
sponte review the decision; however, the person receiving the citation does
not specifically have the right to EAB review.479 In denying a federal agency
the opportunity to consult with the Administrator before a penalty becomes
final, the proposed rule conflicts with Executive Order 12,088, which
requires the Administrator of EPA to attempt to resolve environmental
enforcement conflicts with executive agencies.480 At a minimum, EPA must
474 See supra notes 459-62 and accompanying text.
411 See supra note 462 and accompanying text.
476 See Field Citation Program, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,776, 22,786, 22,792 (1994) (to be codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. pt. 59) (proposed May 3, 1994).
477 See id. at 22,787, 22,793.
411 See id. at 22,788, 22795.
479 See id.
480 See Exec. Order No. 12,088, supra note 471-72.
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afford executive agencies the opportunity to appeal regional administrator
decisions to the Administrator.48
DOD wants EPA to afford federal agencies part 22 hearing
procedures for field citations. 82 It argues that section 118(a) requires EPA
to treat federal facilities "in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernment entity. 4 83  Since federal agencies cannot seek section
113(d)(4) judicial review, EPA should afford federal agencies part 22 hearii8 g
procedures as an alternative to judicial review. 84 This would be consistent
with the procedures EPA affords federal agencies under RCRA.485 Under a
part 22 scheme, a federal facility incurring a field citation could request an
administrative hearing before a regional hearing officer, appeal that officer's
decision to the EAB, and appeal the EAB's ruling to the Administrator.
There are several reasons why EPA should afford federal agencies
part 22 hearing procedures under the field citation program. First, it will
substantially limit the number of disputes federal agencies will raise to the
Administrator. Part 22 procedures, with appeal by right to the EAB, will
address and resolve most issues federal agencies might raise. Second, taking
the final agency decision away from the regional administrators and applying
the part 22 procedures will make the program more consistent throughout the
country. This is especially important for federal agencies, such as DOD, that
operate throughout every region in the country. Third, agencies enjoying part
22 procedures are less likely to raise field citation disputes outside EPA to
48 EPA may have recently changed their position on this issue. In their memorandum to
the Office of Legal Counsel, EPA stated that federal agencies will have the opportunity to
consult with the Administrator before any penalty is final. See Cannon and Miller Memo-
randum, supra note 343, at 8 (citing Memorandum on Assessment of Administrative Penal-
ties Against Federal Facilities Under the Clean Air Act (September 11, 1995), at 5).
482 See DOD Comments, supra note 194, at 1-3.
48 Id. (citing Clean Air Act § 118(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a) (1994)).
484 See id. at 2.
485 EPA affords part 22 procedures for any civil penalties under RCRA sections 3008
(Hazardous Waste Management. Federal enforcement), 9006 (Regulation of Underground
Sto'rage Tanks: Federal enforcement), and 11005 (Medical Waste Tracking Program:
Enforcement). See 40 C.F.R. § 22.01(a)(4) (1996); see also Federal Facility Compliance
Act; Enforcement Authorities Implementation, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,044 (1993).
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either OMB or DOJ. Thus, EPA will maintain greater control over the pro-
gram. Finally, EPA will consistently enforce environmental laws on federal
facilities if it affords federal facilities hearing procedures under the CAA
similar to those under RCRA.
VII. CONCLUSION
It appears that EPA is trying to create a field citation program that will
give the regions greater flexibility and authority to enforce the CAA. It also
appears that EPA is not creating a true field citation program. In developing
the field citation program, EPA should not lose sight of the program's goals:
to deter minor violations; to preserve the Agency's resources; and to
encourage violators to promptly correct their violations and pay their
penalties. The Agency's proposal has three problems: it does not adequately
define "minor violations;" it attempts to impose an improper maximum
penalty; and EPA officials will issue most field citations from their offices,
rather than in the field.
The Agency has declined to fully define "minor violations." Instead,
EPA lists several factors that determine whether violations are minor. How-
ever, the Agency does not completely explain the factors. Thus, the Agency
gives considerable discretion to the various regional inspectors. To develop
an efficient field citation program, EPA either should devise a comprehensive
list of minor violations and appropriate penalties, or it should explain fully
the factors that EPA officials should consider in identifying minor violations.
The Agency believes that it can impose penalties of $5000 a day for
each violation. This interpretation misreads the clear language of section
I 13(d)(3). It also conflicts with the goal of encouraging violators to promptly
correct their violations and pay their penalties. While a greater maximum
penalty amount will deter minor violations of the Act, it will also encourage
recipients to challenge large penalties. The Agency will overextend its re-
sources addressing these challenges. EPA should limit field citation penalties
to $5000 for each day of violation, and cap the total penalty amount at
$25,000.
The Agency plans to permit its officials to base field citations on
information from state and local inspectors. Perhaps EPA needs to use such
information because the state and local authorities perform the vast majority
of the inspections under the Act. However, this reliance on state information
will likely result in EPA officials issuing more field citations from their
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offices than from the field. Thus, the citations will not have the direct and
immediate impact of a traffic ticket that an officer issues to a violator on the
spot. If EPA officials use second-hand information to issue field citations,
they should verify the information and consider any explanations they receive
from the citation recipients. Otherwise, EPA officials might issue field cita-
tions when circumstances do not justify them. This potential for unjustified
citations, too, will encourage more recipients to challenge their citations.
If EPA intends to address the major issues through guidelines it will
need to submit some of the guidelines for public comment. The Agency must
submit to public comment any guidelines that identify minor violations or
calculate appropriate penalties because they will affect significant private
interests and restrict the EPA officials' discretion.
The CAA gives EPA authority to impose the field citation program
on federal agencies, as federal agencies are "persons" under the CAA.
Congress included federal agencies in the CAA's definition of "person" in
order to subject them to all of the enforcement provisions in CAA section
113. While section 113(d)(3) does not state specifically that EPA may issue
field citations to any person, it does refer to persons while discussing hearing
procedures. Additionally, section 113(d)(1) of the CAA authorizes the
Administrator to assess civil administrative penalties against any person.486
The Supreme Court's ruling in United States Department of Energy
v. Ohio does not preclude EPA from applying the field citation program to
federal agencies. In this case, the Court held that CAA section 118 does not
waive the United States' immunity to civil penalties. However, the Court
also stated:
As far as federal law is concerned, the only available source
of authority to impose punitive fines is the civil-penalties
section, [CWA] § 1319(d). But, as we have already seen, that
section does not authorize liability against the United States,
486 CAA section 1 13(d)(1) states, in part: "The Administrator may issue an administrative
order against any person assessing a civil administrative penalty of up to $25,000, per day
of violation, whenever, on the basis of any available information, the Administrator finds that
such person .... " 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(1) (1994).
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since it applies only against "persons," from whom the United
States is excluded.487
Since a federal agency is a "person" under the 1990 version of the CAA, the
CAA's civil-penalties section (CAA section 113) authorizes punitive fines
against federal agencies for CAA violations.
The unitary executive doctrine does not preclude the EPA from im-
posing the field citation program against federal agencies. The Agency does
not need to rely upon CAA section 118 for a waiver of sovereign immunity.
Therefore, the section 118(a) requirement that federal agencies comply with
administrative enforcement authority "in the same manner, and to the same
extent as any nongovernmental entity," does not prevent EPA from applying
the program to federal facilities. However, the unitary executive doctrine
affords the President the opportunity to resolve disputes between agencies
within the Executive Branch. The President issued Executive Orders 12,088
and 12,146 to resolve environmental enforcement disputes between executive
agencies. Therefore, EPA must at least afford an executive agency the
opportunity to consult with the Administrator when disputing a field citation.
The best solution for EPA is to afford federal agencies part 22 procedures
under the field citation program. This will keep administrative enforcement
procedures for federal agencies consistent throughout the country and across
the media statutes covering air pollution and solid waste. Also, part 22
procedures will free the Administrator from having to personally resolve
numerous disputes between federal facilities and regional offices.
411 United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 624 (1992).
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